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DISCRIMINATION LAW-STATUTORY PROTECTION FOR VOLUN­
TEERS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of 
America, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 204 
Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (1987). 
INTRODUCTION 
In Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts ofAmerica, Inc. v. Commission 
on Human Rights and Opportunities,l the Connecticut Supreme Court 
held that the Boy Scouts of America did not discriminate under Con­
necticut's public accommodation statute2 when it denied Catherine 
Pollard the opportunity to be scoutmaster because she is a woman. 
The court based its decision on its belief that the proffer of services is 
not an accommodation as that term is used in the statute.3 In rejecting 
Pollard's offer to serve, the court concluded that the Boy Scouts did 
not refuse her any accommodation and thus did not violate the 
statute.4 
Quinnipiac Council presents a question much broader than 
whether Ms. Pollard should have been allowed to be a scoutmaster; it 
implicates the legal rights of all volunteers to serve free of discrimina­
tion.5 According to Quinnipiac Council, volunteers who suffer dis­
1. 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (1987). 
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-63(1), 46a-64(a)(I) (West 1986) (formerly codi­
fied at § 53-35(a) (Rev. 1977). For the text of the statute, see infra note 27. 
3. Catherine Pollard claimed that her offering to be ofservice to the organization was 
an "llccommodation" whereas the court stated that an "accommodation" is the establish­
ment's making available its goods and services to the public. Quinnipiac Council, 204 
Conn. at 301, 528 A.2d at 360. For a detailed discussion of this distinction, see infra notes 
206-07 and accompanying text. 
4. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 301, 528 A.2d at 360. 
5. Voluntarism is deeply rooted in American culture. In fact, it was the combined 
efforts of many unnamed volunteers that marked and shaped the development of the 
United States. For a historical account of the involvement of volunteers in America since 
colonial times, see S. ELLIS & K. NOYES, By THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF AMERICANS 
As VOLUNTEERS (1978). 
Today, an estimated 37 million Americans, or one out of every four over the age of 
fourteen, participate in volunteer activities. These statistics, however, are based only on 
involvement in formalized or organized volunteer groups. If unorganized services could be 
calculated and added, the figures would increase dramatically. K. ALLEN, WORKER VOL­
UNTEERING: A NEW RESOURCE FOR THE 1980s 5 (1980). 
Given the diversity of American life, volunteers engage in a variety of work in many 
areas including the fields of labor, agriculture, business and industry, communication, 
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crimination based on race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, 
marital status, age, or physical disability6 receive no protection or re­
lief from the accommodation statute. Perhaps uncomfortable with the 
implications of its decision, the Quinnipiac Council court itself referred 
volunteers claiming discrimination to the labor employment statute 
for possible protection. 7 
Since the plaintiff's challenge in Quinnipiac Council was under 
the Connecticut public accommodation statute, this note, in Part I, 
first discusses the legislative and judicial expansion of the public ac­
commodation statute and the countervailing constitutional limitations 
to its scope. This section also considers the policy, statutory, and con­
stitutional dimensions of the conflict between the protected classes' 
claimed right to non-discriminatory treatment and the organization's 
asserted freedom of selection. Against this background, Part II fo­
cuses on the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision excluding the prof­
fer of services from the scope of the public accommodation statute. 8 
Part III explores whether, despite Quinnipiac Council's holding, vol­
unteers can find protection from discrimination under a reinterpreted 
or an amended public accommodation statute.9 The note then ad­
dresses difficulties raised by broadening the coverage of the public ac­
commodation statute to encompass volunteers. Protecting volunteers 
under the public accommodation statute runs the risk of infringing on 
the asserted rights of the organization-whether the boy scouts, a reli­
gious group or a political organization-to select its volunteers ac­
cording to its own standards. lO On account of these incongruities, 
Part IV!! evaluates the Connecticut Supreme Court's suggestion that 
transportation, social welfare, health care, education, religion, recreation, the arts, environ­
mentalism, justice, the military, civic and political activism, and foreign involvement. For 
an in-depth discussion of the various forms of voluntarism in each of these fields, see S. 
ELLIS & K. NOYES, supra, at 227-50. 
6. Discrimination in access to public accommodations based on these categories is 
prohibited by CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64(a)(I) (West 1986). The District of Co­
lumbia additionally bans discrimination based on classifications of sexual orientation, ma­
triculation, and political affiliation. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2519(a) (1981 & Supp. 1988). 
7. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 302, 528 A.2d at 360. See CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 46a-6O(a)(I) (West 1986) (protects individuals from employment refusals, dis­
charges, and unequal treatment in the terms and conditions of employment due to race, 
color, creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of 
mental disorder, mental retardation, or physical disability). See infra note 187 for the full 
text of Connecticut's Unfair Employment Practice Act. 
8. See infra notes 149-98 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 228-33 and accompanying text. 
II. See infra notes 211-98 and accompanying text. 
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the employment statute might safeguard volunteers' interests. 12 
I. THE ACCOMMODATION STATUTES 
A. History and Purpose 
The public accommodation statutes have their origin in the com­
mon law obligation of innkeepers and "common carriers" to admit 
and serve all travellers. 13 The statutes rested on the premise that these 
privately-owned businesses were in some degree public. 14 Thus, the 
owners had a duty to provide equal access to all. IS The public accom­
modation statutes were enacted to protect this access. 
As a reinforcement of the common law, the public accommoda­
tion statutes have a long history. Proscription of discrimination in 
public accommodations dates back to the Civil War period and the 
enactment of the Civil War amendments. 16 After the ratification of 
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution,17 Congress enacted the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 in an attempt to protect blacks from discrimi­
natory acts by state officials and private persons. IS The Act prohibited 
racial discrimination in motels, theaters, places of public amusements, 
and on public transportation. 19 
When the United States Supreme Court, in the Civil Rights Cases 
12. See infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text. 
13. Avins, What is a Place of "Public" Accommodation?, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 1,2-7 
(1968); Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New 
Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1249-50 (1967); Note, Discrimination in Access to 
Public Places: A Survey ofState and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REv. 
L. Soc. CHANGE 215, 218 (1978). 
14. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 13, at 1249-50. 
15. Id. 
16. See Stephenson, The Separation of the Races in Public Conveyances, 3 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 180, 184 (1909). . 
17. The fourteenth amendment was ratified in 1868. The first section of it states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdic­
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
Relying on the authority of this first section, Congress passed the Civil Rights Bill of 
1875. See Stephenson, supra note 16, at 184. 
18. Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, ch. 114, §§ 1-2 (1875). This statute states 
in part: "[A]II persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the 
full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of 
inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement 
...." It prohibited discrimination based on race and color. Id. 
19. Id. 
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of 1883,20 invalidated the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
against private individuals,21 states soon began to enact their own pub­
lic accommodation statutes,22 and, at present, thirty-nine states and 
the District of Columbia have such laws.23 Finally, in its most recent 
20. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). These cases involved four criminal 
indictments and one civil action under Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The 
section provided that anyone who racially discriminated against others so as to bar them 
from "full and equal enjoyment" of public facilities and conveyances was subject to crimi­
nal and civil penalties. 18 Stat. 335, ch. 114, § 1 (1875). The five defendants were individu­
als and railroads who had excluded blacks from their facilities on the basis of race. Since 
the Court determined that these claims did not involve state action, the plaintiffs 'were not 
protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Even though the concept of state conduct is now 
broader, the Supreme Court continues to hold that there is no violation of the fourteenth 
amendment absent state action. Comment, The Fourteenth Amendment. Congressional 
Power. and Private Discrimination: United States v. Guest, 14 UCLA L. REV. 553, 578-79 
(1967). 
21. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed protection only 
against governmental or state action and that legislative regulation of private wrongs under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was an unwarranted and unconstitutional expansion offederal 
powers over individuals. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
22. In the 1880's, a number of northern states including Connecticut, Indiana, Mas­
sachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island passed 
statutes which were near replicas of the federal act. Stephenson, supra note 16, at 186; 
Avins, supra note 13, at 14-22 (discussion of early state statutes modeled on the federal 
act). 
23. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.200-18.80.300 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41­
1441 to 41-1442 (1985); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 24-34-601 to 24-34-605 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-63 to 46a-64 
(West 1986 & Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4501-4516 (1975, Supp. 1986 & 
1987 Interim Supp.); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2504, 1-2511, 1-2519 (1981 & Supp. 
1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7301 to 18-7303 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 5-101 to 
5-103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-1 to 22-9-1-3 (West 1981 & 
Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.I-601A.7 (West 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44­
1001, 44-1009(c) (1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.120-334.145 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 
1983 & Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4551-4553, 4591-4593 (1979 & Supp. 
1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5-13 (1986 & Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2301­
37.2303 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-363.03 (West 1966 & 
Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-102(2), 49-2-304 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20­
132 to 20-143 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651.050-651.120 (Michie 1986); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:l, 354-A:3(IX), 354-A:8(IV) (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5­
5(1) to 10:5-12 (West 1976 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2(H), 28-1-7(F), 28-1­
9 (1988); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290(3), 291(2), 292(9), 296(2) (McKinney 1982); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (1985 & Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01­
4112.02 (Anderson 1980 & Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1401-1402 (West 
1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.670-30.685 (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-954,955 
(i) (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1988); R.1. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-24-1 to 11-24-8 (1981 & Supp. 
1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 20-13-1(12), 20-13-23 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 4-21-501 to 4-21-503 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-1 to 13-7-4 (1986 & Supp. 
1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4501-4502 (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 9.91.010, 49.60.010, 49.60.030(2), 49.60.040, 49.60.215 (1962, 1988 & Supp. 1988); W. 
VA. CODE §§ 5-11-2,5-11-3, 5-11-9(f), 5-11-19 (1987 & Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
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response to this issue, Congress enacted a federal public accommoda­
tion statute in 1964.24 
Although public accommodations were originally limited to the 
two general categories of innkeepers and "common carriers," the pres­
ent meaning of public accommodation is much broader. It now en­
compasses any establishment which offers goods. and services to the 
public.2s 
B. The Connecticut Accommodation Statute 
Like many states,26 Connecticut has followed the general trend 
and broadened the scope of its public accommodation statute.27 Prior 
to 1953, the Connecticut statute defined a "place of public accommo­
§§ 942.04(1)(b), 942.04(2), ~42;04(3} (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); WYo. STAT. § 6-9-101 
(1988). Louisiana guarantees equal access to public accommodations in its constitutional 
provision. LA. CoNST. art. I, § 12. The following states are without public accommoda­
tion statutes: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida; Georgia, Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. 
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1982). Nearly a century after the 1883 decision in 
the Civil Rights Cases, when Congress again sought to eliminate discrimination in public 
accommodations, it relied on additional constitutional provisions. Since the Court had 
greatly expanded the scope of the commerce clause (see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937», the drafters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1982» relied upon the authority of both the four­
teenth amendment and the commerce clause. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). See also Note, 
Civil Rights Act of 1964-Public Accommodations-Private Club Exemption, 45 N.C. L. 
REV. 498, 499-500 (1967); Avins, supra note 13, at 7-14. 
25. See Note, supra note 13, at 218, 290-91. Public accommodations now include: 
cemeteries, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (1982), beauty parlors and barber 
shops, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(12) (1986), garages and gas stations, see, e.g., 
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(8) (1979 & SUpp. 1988), swimming pools, see, e.g., 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A(5) (West Supp. 1988), and bathhouses and 
restrooms, see, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(24) (1981 & Supp. 1988). 
26. See generally Note, supra note 13 (offering a discussion and comparison of the 
development of states' public accommodation statutes). 
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64(a)(1) (West 1986) provides in part: 
It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any 
person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any 
place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, 
color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, mental retardation or 
physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the ap­
plicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and ap­
plicable alike to all persons; (2) to discriminate, segregate or separate on account 
of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, mental 
retardation or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or 
deafness. 
Id. 
.. 'Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement' means any establishment 
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dation" by listing establishments which offered food, lodging, trans­
portation, or entertainment to the general public.28 In 1953, the 
Connecticut legislature abandoned the list approach and adopted in­
stead a functional definition; a place of public accommodation is now 
defined as any "establishment which caters or offers its services or fa­
cilities or goods to the general public ...."29 
By defining "public accommodation" functionally in terms of 
conduct engaged in by the establishment, the legislature expanded the 
coverage of the Connecticut law. Most obviously, the class of persons 
and businesses subject to the law is now much broader and hence more 
inclusive. More importantly, the prohibition against discrimination 
applies to all qualified "establishments" and is no longer limited to 
specific places. 30 In addition to the more expansive definition of 
"place of public accommodation," the Connecticut legislature also has 
enlarged the scope of the statute by adding sex,3) physical disability,32 
and marital status33 as additional classes of persons protected from 
which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public ...." Id. at 
§ 46a-63(1). 
28. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 691a (Supp. 1949). Prior to 1953, the Connecticut legisla­
ture defined a "public accommodation" as: "[A]II ... inns, taverns, roadhouses, hotels, 
restaurants and eating houses or any place where food is sold for consumption on the 
premises; railroad cars and stations, street railway cars and stations, public service busses 
and taxicabs; and theaters, motion picture houses, music haIls, amusement and recreation 
parks." Id. 
29. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-63(1) (West 1986). 
30. "[T]he unconditional language of the statute, the history of its steadily expanded 
coverage, and the compelling interest in eliminating discriminatory public accommodation 
practices persuade us that physical situs is not today an essential element of our public 
accommodation law." Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Commission on 
Human Rights and Opportunities, 204 Conn. 287, 297, 528 A.2d 352, 358 (1987). 
"[T]he amended Connecticut statute does not define a place of. public accommodation 
merely in terms of locale; it does not say 'any establishment where services or facilities or 
goods are offered' .... Rather, 'place of public accommodation' is now defined as 'any 
establishment which . .. offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public.' The 
shift in emphasis and meaning is clear." Brief for Defendant by Susan Bartholomew at 18, 
Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America v. Commission on Human Rights and Oppor­
tunities, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (1987) (qouting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Commission 
on Human Rights and Opportunities, 204 Conn. 287, 297, 528 A.2d 352, 358 (1987». The 
defendant based her analysis on the interpretation of the Minnesota statute in United States 
Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1981). 
31. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64(a)(I) (West 1986). Sex was added as a pro­
hibited reason for the refusal of public accommodations in 1973 Conn. Acts 119. 
32. Id. In 1973, the Connecticut legislature inserted: "or physical disability, includ­
ing but not limited to, blindness" into the public accommodation statute. See 1973 Conn. 
Acts 279, § 6. 
33. Id. In 1974, the Connecticut legislature amended the accommodation statute by 
inserting "marital status." See 1974 Conn. Acts 205. 
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discrimination.34 
As stated above, public accommodation laws of other states have 
evolved in a similar manner.35 As a result, the statutes of different 
states frequently resemble one another both with regard to the cover­
age encompassed by "place of public accommodation"36 and to the 
classes protected under the statutes.37 This similarity has permitted 
courts to refer to judicial interpretations of other states' public accom­
modation statutes in discussing the meaning and scope of their own.38 
34. For the full text of the Connecticut public accommodation statute, see supra note 
27. 
35. See Note, supra note 13. "Many public accommodations statutes have undergone 
frequent amendments and additions since their original appearance on the statute books. 
As legislative awareness of and hostility toward discrimination has grown, more accommo· 
dations were added, additional groups protected, and definitions of the offense expanded." 
Id. at 245. 
36. The Minnesota statute, which uses a general definition, states that "place of pub­
lic accommodation" means a "business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, rec· 
reation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or 
otherwise made available to the public." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(18) (West 1966 & 
Supp. 1988). 
Some states, while maintaining a list definition of "place of public accommodation," 
nevertheless share the broad scope of statutes with general definitions by using such terms 
as: "including but not limited to." See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441 (1985); COLO. 
REv. STAT. § 24-34-501 (1982); IDAHO CoDE § 18-7302 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 
§ 13-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(8) (1979 & Supp. 
1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 1970 & Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 49-2-101(17) (1987); NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-133 (1987); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 651.050 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 1976 & Supp. 1988); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(1) (purdon 1964 & Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-3 
(1981); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (1962 & Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. § 942.04(2) 
(West 1982 & Supp. 1988). New Jersey's statute states in part: "'A place of public accom· 
modation' shall include, but not be limited to: any tavern, roadhouse, hotel, motel [;] ... 
any producer, manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, retail shop, store, establishment, or 
concession dealing with goods or services of any kind; any restaurant ... [or] any public 
conveyance ...." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 1976 & Supp. 1988). 
37. Public accommodation statutes commonly protect against discrimination due to 
race, color, national origin, ancestry, religion, sex, marital status, and physical handicap. 
See Note, supra note 13, at 292-93. 
38. See Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 473-75, 477 (3d 
Cir. 1986); Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 80-81, 707 P.2d 212, 
217,219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 155 (1985); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of 
Am., 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 732, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 337 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 
1205 (1984); United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 772-73 (Minn. 1981). 
These courts have made references and analogies to New Jersey's public accommodation 
statute as interpreted in National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 
127 N.J. Super. 522,318 A.2d 33 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974). 
The Quinnipiac Council court stated that its understanding of the Connecticut public 
accommodation statute "accords with that of other courts in our sister states construing 
similar legislation." Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 299. The citations include decisions 
based on the public accommodation statutes of California, Minnesota, and New Jersey. Id. 
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C. Judicial Interpretations 
This modem and broader definition of "place of public accommo­
dation" presents courts with the challenge of re-interpreting the appli­
cable statute when confronted with new places, groups, and activities. 
This section examines cases where individuals, for reasons based on 
race, gender, and sexual orientation, have been denied membership in 
various organizations, such as athletic teams,39 boys' clubs,4O and 
men's business associations.41 The judicial decisions applying the re­
spective public accommodations statutes to each· of these organiza­
tions illustrate the continued trend towards expanding the scope of 
these statutes. 
Ms. Pollard sought to continue this expansion and further 
broaden the scope of Connecticut's public accommodation statute. 
Like prior plaintiffs, Pollard was requesting a "male-only" positiop in 
an association which the courts, in the following cases, had held was 
subject to the public accommodation statute. However, unlike these 
other plaintiffs, she was denied protection under the public accommo­
dation statute. In order to understand and evaluate the Connecticut 
Supreme Court's refusal to protect· Pollard against discrimination by 
the Boy Scouts, a general exposition of these. fundamental cases is re­
quired. They provide the rationale for the court's distinguishing Ms. 
Pollard from women granted relief from sex discrimination in prior 
analogous situations. 
1) Athletic Teams 
National Organization/or Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc. 42 
and the United States v. Slidell Youth Football Association 43 were ac­
tions brought under public accommodation statutes for alleged dis­
crimination in athletics. In Little League, the club barred girls from 
Like the Connecticut Supreme Court, this note supports its examination and discussion of 
Quinnipiac Council by reference to other states' decisions based on similar public accom~ 
modation statutes. 
39. United States v. Slidell Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1974); 
National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 
A.2d 33 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974). 
40. Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 707 P.2d 212, 219 Cal. 
Rptr. 150 (1985); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 147 Cal. 
App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984). 
41. Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806'F.2d 468 (3d·Cir. 1986); United 
States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981). 
42. 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A.2d 33 (1974), aff'd, 67 N:J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974). 
43. 387 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1974). 
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joining the team,44 while in Slidell, the league excluded blacks from 
participation.4s In both of these cases, the courts were not confronted 
with a traditional place of public accommodation such as a restau­
rant,46 lodging,47 or golf course;48 instead, the courts faced a novel 
issue: whether a team or league was a place of public accommodation. 
An organization is subject to the public accommodation statute 
only if it is a "place" within the meaning of the statute, and only if it is 
"public."49 The New Jersey Superior Court in Little League stated 
that the term "place" is one "of convenience, not of limitation."so 
Although "place" customarily meant a fixed site, such as a restaurant 
or a hotel, the court held that it also included a moving situs such as 
public transportation. To be a "place" did not require that the organi­
zation own or lease a specific parcel of real estate. The league's 
"place" was any ballfield at which it played.sl 
The Little League court placed more emphasis on the need to be 
public than on the need for a specific non-changing locus. 
"[M]embership organizations, although not having a 'specific 
pinpointable geographic area,' are nevertheless places of public accom­
modation if, as Little League does, they offer advantages and facilities 
on the basis of a general, public invitation to join."s2 As the court 
stated, "the hallmark of a place of public accommodation [is] that 'the 
public at large is invited.' "53 
The Slidell court54 likewise found that a sports team was a public 
44. Little League, 127 N.J. Super. at 526, 31S A.2d at 35. 
45. Slidell, 387 F. Supp. at 478, 480. 
46. See Evans v. Fong Poy, 42 Cal. App. 2d 320, 108 P.2d 942 (1941) (plaintiffs' 
rights violated when they were refused services by restaurant on racial grounds). 
47. See Stout v. YMCA of Bessemer, Alabama, 404 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1968) 
(yMCA, which provided lodging for transient guests, wrongfully discriminated when it 
refused to accommodate two men solely because they were black). 
48. See Anderson v. Pass Christian Isles Golf Club, 488 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1974) (in 
denying access on the basis of race, the court held that the club violated the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964). 




53. Id. (emphasis added). Little League was a "place of public accommodation" 
because its sites, though not fixed, were open to the public at large and because it invited all 
children, except girls, to join. Id. It offered its "accommodations, advantages, facilities 
and privileges" which the court defined as "the entire agglomeration of the arrangements" 
for baseball playing by children to the general public. Id. 
54. In Slidell, an organization of white families owned a field and supported a foot­
baJlleague for young white males in the area. Slidell, 387 F. SUpp. at 476. The court ruled 
that since this organization was a public accommodation, it could not exclude blacks from 
membership and participation. Id. at 486. The plaintiffs pled their claim under 42 U.S.c., 
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accommodation because it offered all area youth the entertainment of 
playing football and provided a form of spectator entertainment to the 
general public. 55 According to these decisions, an organization is pub.,. 
lic if membership is open to all. The absence of any membership re­
quirements, save sex or race, made these organizations public 
accommodations subject to the statute. 
2) Boys' Clubs 
Two recent California cases held that a Boy Scouts of America 
Councils6 and a Boys' Club Chapter57 were "business establishments" 
under the Unruh Act, California's public accommodation statute. 58 
In Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts,59 the Boy Scouts 
had expelled a scout member because he was a homosexual and there­
fore, supposedly, a poor moral example for the younger boys.60 In 
Isbister v. Boys' Club ofSanta Cruz, Inc.,61 the Boys' Club barred all 
young women from becoming members.62 Both cases were perplexing 
because neither the scouts nor the club was a "business establishment" 
in the ordinary sense of the term.63 However, the court continued the 
Title II of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. This statute has been applied to recrea­
tional organizations which claimed they were private clubs not open to the public at large. 
The courts found that despite their contentions to the contrary, these clubs offered mem­
bership to the public at large and could not exclude a particular class protected by the 
statute. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1969) (recreational area which provided 
a snackbar, swimming, boating, miniature golf, and dancing); Smith v. Young Men's Chris­
tian Ass'n of Montgomery, 462 F.2d 634, 649 (5th Cir. 1972) (men's civic recreational 
organization); Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Raleigh, N.C., 397 F.2d 96, 100 
(4th Cir. 1968)(yMCA health and athletic club). These cases held that segregation on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin was illegal. Title II does not cover gender discrim­
ination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982). 
55. Slidell, 387 F. Supp. at 483. 
56. Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 707 P.2d 212, 219 Cal. 
Rptr. 150 (1985). 
57. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 147 Cal. App. 3d 
712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984). 
58. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988). The Unruh Civil Rights Act 
provides in part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no 
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other 
physical disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." [d. 
59. 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983). 
60. Id. at 718, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 328. 
61. 40 Cal. 3d 72, 707 P.2d 212, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1985). 
62. Id. at 77, 707 P.2d at 215, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 153. 
63. As noted in Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 
Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962), a "business" is generally defined as a "calling, occupation, or trade, 
engaged in for the purpose of making a livelihood [or profit] [sic] or gain." [d. at 468, 370 
P.2d at 316, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (quoting Mansfield v. Hyde, 112 Cal. App. 2d 133, 137, 
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trend towards a broad construction of public accommodation statutes 
and subjected these organizations to the requirements of the public 
accommodation law. 
Both the Curran and Isbister courts noted that the legislature 
passed the Unruh Act in response to prior judicial decisions which 
improperly limited the meaning of "place of public accommodation"64 
and intended in its 1959 revision to expand, not restrict, the scope of 
the statute.65 Focusing on the words "all" and "of every kind whatso­
ever" in referring to business establishments, the courts held that 
"business" included both commercial and non-commercial entities.66 
Thus, despite their claims of being non-profit organizations exempt 
from the statute, both the Boy Scouts and the Boys' Club fit within a 
broad definition of a "business establishment. "67 Since both organiza­
tions were open to all male youth and made no attempt to restrict or 
select members on any basis other than sex or sexual preference,68 they 
were public accommodations, forbidden by the Unruh Act from dis­
criminating against a protected class.69 These two California cases 
further exemplify the trend to extend the coverage of public accommo­
245 P.2d 577, 581 (1952». The courts examined whether the club and the scouts as public 
recreational organizations were removed from the commercial world and therefore outside 
the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 78-79, 707 P.2d at 215-16, 219 Cal. 
Rptr. 153-54; Curran, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 729, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 335. 
64. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 78,707 P.2d at 215, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 153; Curran, 147 Cal. 
App. 3d at 728, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 335. According to the Isbister court; appellate courts 
inappropriately limited the term "place of public accommodation" in Long v. Mountain 
View Cemetery Ass'n, 130 Cal. App. 2d 328, 278 P.2d 945 (1955) (private cemetery not 
covered); Reed v. Hollywood Professional School, 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 338 P.2d 
633 (1959) (private school not covered); and Coleman v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App. 2d 
Supp. 833, 305 P.2d 1020 (1957) (dentist's office not covered). Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 78-79, 
707 P.2d 215-16, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 154. 
65. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 78, 707 P.2d at 215,219 Cal. Rptr. at 153; Curran, 147 Cal. 
App. 3d at 728, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 335. Nevertheless, the courts had yet to determine 
whether the phrase "business establishments" also included public accommodations and 
amusements of the' pre-1959 statute. Curran and Isbister held that the legislature, in adopt­
ing the phrase "in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever," intended to go 
beyond, but not preclude, the earlier statutory public accommodations. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d 
at 78, 707 P.2d at 215-16,219 Cal. Rptr. at 153; Curran, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 728, 195 Cal. 
Rptr. at 335. 
66. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 82-83, 707 P.2d at 218, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 156-57; Curran, 
147 Cal. App. 3d at 729, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 335. 
67. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 83, 707 P.2d at 219, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 157; Curran, 147 Cal. 
App. 3d at 730, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 336. 
68. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 81, 707 P.2d at 217-18, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 155; Curran, 147 
Cal. App. 3d at 723-24, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 331-32. 
69. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 91, 707 P.2d at 224-25, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63; Curran, 
147 Cal. App. 3d at 734, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 339. 
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dation statutes. 70 
3) Businessmen's Associations 
Another series of cases in the early and mid-1980's addressed the 
question of whether certain businessmen's associations were public 
-accommodations.71 These cases posed an even greater challenge to the 
courts than did the athletic team or boys' clubs sex discrimination 
cases for three main reasons. First, it was not obvious whether men's 
associations offered goods and services,72 and under the statutes, estab­
lishments typically are public accommodations only if they offer 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, or advantages to the public.73 
Secondly, businessmen's associations varied more among them­
selves than did boys' clubs or athletic teams. The purpose, activities, 
and membership requirements were particular to each businessmen's 
club. Some had a permanent site at which to gather, while others were 
more like the Little League and alternated their meeting places.74 
Some specified extensive criteria before admitting members, while 
others permitted entrance so long as the male applicant paid the mini­
mal dues. 75 Some opened their activities to the public while others did 
not.76 As a result of these differences among businessmen's associa­
70. Moreover, Isbister illustrates the court's intention to protect women from dis­
crimination in places of public accoinmodation. As a sex discrimination decision, Isbister 
was a case of first impression, holding that girls had a right of equal access to such clubs. 
Prior cases dealing with boys' clubs involved racial discrimination. See Smith v. Young 
Men's Christian Ass'n of Montgomery, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972); Nesmith v. Young , 
Men's Christian Ass'n of Raleigh, 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968)." 
71. See Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 

3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Cal: Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987); Kiwanis 

Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1986); United States Jaycees v. 

McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981). " " 

72. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227; McClure, 305 

N.W.2d at 772. 

73. See infra note 86 for Minnesota's definition of "place of public accommodation." 

See supra note 58 for California's Unruh Act. 

74. The Jaycees have "oft-shifted sites" for their local chapter meetings. McClure, 

305 N.W.2d at 772. But see Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. SUpp. 

1182, 1203 (D. Conn. 1974) (all-male association met at the local lodge). 

75. Compare Kiwanis, 806 F.2d at 473-74 (local club, faced with expulsion from the 

international organization when it contravened the group's constitution by admitting wo­

men, was a private club because it had definite criteria for the screening and" selection of 

members), with McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 771 (the Jaycees had no standards for the admis­

sion of new members). 

76. Opening participation to the public is consistent with achieving the broad pur­

poses of some groups. For example, the objective of the Jaycees is to pursue" 'such educa­

tional and charitable purposes as will promote . . . development of young men's civic 

organizations in the United States ... [and] particip!ltion by young men in the affairs of 

their community, state and nation.''' Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612­
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tions, courts were precluded from applying a blanket rule. Instead, 
they scrutinized the characteristics and practices of each club before 
determining whether it was a public accommodation. 77 
Finally, the courts also confronted the argument that enforce­
ment of the accommodation statute against the association violated 
the groups' right to freedom of association.78 Though the latter claim 
is properly a federal issue,79 the state courts nevertheless interpreted 
their state statutes in light of this first amendment concern. 
In United States Jaycees v. McClure 80 and Rotary Club ofDuarte 
v. Board ofDirectors ofRotary International,8l women brought actions 
against the organizations for excluding them from membership.82 
Both cases resolved the issue of whether the organization was a "place 
of public accommodation" by focusing on the conduct of the organiza­
tions,83 the nature of the goods and privileges they offered to the pub­
13 (1984) (quoting Bylaw 2-1 of the United States Jaycees (1978-79) from Brieffor Appel­
lee 2). 
Similarly, the purposes of the Rotary Club are international and necessitate wide par­
ticipation. Rotary International defines itself as " 'an organization of business and profes­
sional men united worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage high ethical 
standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world.''' Rotary Club, 
178 Cal. App. 3d at 1044, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (quoting MANUAL OF PROCEDURE 7 
(1981), MANUAL OF PROCEDURE 7 (1978) of International Rotary, a non-profit organiza­
tion composed of local Rotary Clubs). 
77. The court in McClure rejected the plaintiff's suggestion that the court view the 
Jaycees as analogous to the Kiwanis International Organization, a private club. McClure, 
305 N.W.2dat 771. "[W]e [must] look at what this national organization is by itself." Id. 
78. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Board of Directors of 
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S.Ct. 1940 (1987). These decisions addressed 
the conflict between the states' efforts to eliminate sex discrimination against women and 
the constitutional freedom of association claimed by members of male organizations. See 
infra Part I, Section D, 2. 
79. Freedom of association is protected by the first amendment of the constitution. 
See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text for the relationship between the right of 
freedom of association and the first amendment. 
80. 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981). 
81. 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 
1940 (1987). In affirming the California Court of Appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that requiring California Rotary Clubs to admit women under the state's Unruh Civil 
Rights Act did not violate the clubs' first amendment rights of freedom of private associa­
tion or of expressive association. See infra Part I, Section D, 2. 
82. The Jaycees welcomed women to all their functions but only admitted women as 
associate members. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 773. The Rotarians permitted women to 
attend meetings, give speeches, receive awards, and form auxiliaries, but denied women 
membership. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1941. 
. 83. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1048, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 219; McClure, 305 
N.W.2d at 768, 772. 
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lic,84 and the criteria required for them to satisfy the private club 
exemption.8s 
In determining the meaning of "place of public accommodation," 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in McClure noted that the phrase 
"whose goods ... privileges [and] advantages ... are sold or otherwise 
made available to the public"86 of the state's public accommodation 
statute focuses on the types of conduct or activity carried on by the 
establishment rather than on the physical site of the establishment. 87 
Defining a place of public accommodation by the term "whose" in­
stead of "where" emphasizes the conduct in which discrimination is 
unlawful rather than the kinds of sites where discrimination is unlaw­
ful. 88 The California Court of Appeal in Rotary Club also stressed the 
activity of the club rather than its geographical site.89 An establish­
ment "includes not only a fixed location, such as the 'place where one 
is permanently fixed for residence or business,' but also a permanent 
'commercial force or organization' or 'a permanent settled position (as 
in life or business).' "90 
In examining the conduct of the Jaycees and the Rotarians, these 
courts determined that the organizations were public accommodations 
because they offered goods or privileges to the general public.91 Ac­
cording to both courts, the organizations provided substantial business 
benefits to their members in the form of leadership skills, business con­
tacts, and employment promotions.92 The courts held these benefits to 
84. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. 227; McClure, 305 
N.W.2d at 772. . 
85. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1058-59, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27; McClure, 
305 N.W.2d at 770. 
86. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(18) (West 1966 & Supp. 1988). The Minnesota 
statute defines "place of public accommodation" as "a business, accommodation, refresh­
ment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or 
not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are ex­
tended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." Id. 
87.. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 768, 772. 
88. Id. 
89. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1048,224 Cal. Rptr. at 219. 
90. Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 
P.2d 427, 430, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323 (1983». 
91. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227; McClure, 305 
N.W.2d at 772. 
92. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227; McClure, 305 
N.W.2d at 772. Similarly, the purpose of New York City'S Local Law 63, upheld by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 
(1988), was to ensure that clubs do not categorically exclude women and minorities from 
membership in "organizations where business deals are often made and personal contacts 
valuable for business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed." 
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be privileges and advantages offered by the club.93 
Having found that the Jaycee and Rotary Clubs were places of 
public accommodations,94 the courts rejected the organizations' argu­
ments that they were private establishments exempt from the statutes' 
coverage.9S Prior courts had enumerated certain minimum standards 
to determine whether a club was public or private for purposes of the 
accommodation statutes.96 The main criteria include the selectivity 
with which new members are admitted or the formality of membership 
procedures and the existence of limits on the size of the membership.97 
In adopting these criteria, both the Minnesota Supreme Court 
and the California Court of Appeal found the Jaycee and Rotary 
Clubs to be public, rather than private.98 With a recruitment policy 
stressing quantity, not quality, the Jaycees made no effort to be selec­
tive of members and placed no limit on the size of clubs' member­
ship.99 This zealous concern for an unselective and ever-growing 
Id. at 2230 (quoting the New York City Council's statement in Local Law No. 63 of 1984, 
§ I, App. 14-15 (1984». 
93. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227; McClure, 305 
N.W.2d at 772. 
94. Courts in two states and the District of Columbia have found that the United 
States Jaycees was not a place of public accommodation. See United States Jaycees v. 
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 391 Mass. 594,463 N.E.2d 1151 (1984); 
United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1983); and United States 
Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379 (D.C. App. 1981). As noted in the Reply Brief for 
the Defendant by Susan Bartholomew at 13, Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America 
Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 
(1987), the statutes in these states all retain the list approach to define "place of public 
accommodation." Id. This may account for their literal rather than broad interpretation 
of the statute. 
95. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227; McClure, 305 
N.W.2d at 770-71. 
96. Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F.2d 96, 101·02 (4th Cir. 1968); 
Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203 (D. Conn. 
1974); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D. Tex. 1970). The district court 
in Cornelius summarized these criteria in the following list: . 
(a) the selectiveness of the group in the admission of members; (b) the existence 
of formal membership procedures; (c) the degree of membership control over in­
ternal governance, particularly with regard to new members; (d) the history of the 
organization, [for example], was it created or did it make insubstantial changes in 
its prior operation in order to avoid the impact of civil rights legislation?; (e) the 
use of club facilities by non-members; (f) the substantiality of dues; (g) whether 
the organization advertises; [and] (h) the predominance of profit motive. 
Cornelius, 382 F. Supp. at 1203 (citations omitted). 
97. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 770. See supra note 96 for additional criteria estab­
lished by the courts. 
98. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1058-59,224 Cal. Rptr. 226-27; McClure, 305 
N.W.2d at 770-71. 
99. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 771. 
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membership undermined the Jaycees' claim to be a private organiza­
tion. loo Likewise, the high membership turnover in the Rotary Club 
and the lack of "continuous, personal and social" relationships among 
Rotarians precluded them from being a private club.101 
These businessmen's association cases broadened the scope of the 
public accommodation statutes in two ways. First, they underlined 
the importance of the organization's conduct rather than its physical 
locus.102 Secondly, the courts expanded their respective statutes to in­
clude less material goods such as employment skills, benefits, and 
promotions. 103 
D. Limitations On The Public Accommodation Statute 
Broadening public accommodation statutes to include athletic 
teams, boys' clubs, and businessmen's associations presents the hazard 
of over-expanding the statutes. 104 In general, laws prohibiting dis­
crimination recognize and address the problem of over-enforcement lOS 
by exempting certain groups and activities from their coverage and 
permitting discrimination by these exempted groups and activities.106 
100. Id. See also Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 
1986). The same criteria applied to the Kiwanis Ridgewood Club led the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals to conclude that it was not a place of public accommodation since it had 
a selective, non-public membership policy. Id. at 475. 
101. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1058-59,224 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27. 
102. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1048, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 219; McClure, 305 
N.W.2d at 768, 772. 
103. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227; McClure, 305 
N.W.2d at 772. 
104. Over-expanding statutes creates the hazard of including within their scope 
otherwise permissible discrimination. If the boundary of the statutes as established by their 
text, case law, and policy considerations is not properly delineated, then all discrimination 
becomes prohibited even though this proscription violates the challenger's greater compet­
ing rights. Thus, a danger of over-enforcement exists unless "[t]he determination of the 
scope of coverage of the statutes defines a boundary, a place where the prohibition against 
discrimination ends and permission to discriminate begins." Stonefield, Non-Determinative 
Discrimination. Mixed Motives. and the Inner Boundary 0/ Discrimination Law, 35 BUF­
FALO L. REV. 85,96 (1986). 
105. Stonefield, supra note 104, at 99-104. 
106. For example, the Fair Housing Act generally prohibits discriminatory rental 
practices but exempts small landlords from its coverage. 42 U.S.c. §§ 3601-3619 (1982). 
A building occupied by the owner and meant to house no more than four families is exempt 
from the statute's coverage. This exemption reflects the law's esteem for personal auton­
omy which both enhances social welfare and is itself a moral value. Stonefield, supra note 
104, at 100-01. 
The federal employment statute permits employers of a small number of people to 
discriminate with impunity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982) holds that a person with fewer 
than fifteen employees is not technically an "employer" for purposes of the statute.' . 
Religious organizations in specific circumstances may also lawfully discriminate under 
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This section examines countervailing limitations to the public ac­
commodation statutes' scope by looking at examples of arguably per­
missible discrimination against prospective members of various 
associations. These restrictions derive from two distinct sources: a 
concern with the "privateness" of private institutions and the implica­
tions of the constitutional right to freedom of association. Should the 
public accommodation statute be extended to include volunteers, an 
alternative examined in Part III, these two limitations would apply 
equally to them. 
1) Private Institutions 
The public accommodation laws of many states exempt private 
institutions from their coverage and permit private establishments to 
discriminate without penalty.107 However, the statutes generally do 
not list those institutions which qualify for the private exemption. !Os 
the federal act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982). This statute permits religious organiza­
tions to employ individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the 
organization's activities. See also 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (1982) which permits a reli­
gious school to hire employees of a particular religion; 42 U.S.c. § 3607 (1982) which 
permits religious organizations to rent non-commercial dwellings to persons of the same 
religion. 
107. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441.2 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502 (1981 
& Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-7302 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 5-103(A) 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2 (West 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 44-1002(h) (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.130 (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1983); MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 49B, § 5 (1986 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 37.2303 (West 
1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-\38 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.060 (Michie 
1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 1976 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) 
(McKinney 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1401 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 30.675(2) (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(1) (purdon 1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11­
24-3 (1981); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 4-21-501 (1985); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-30) (1987 & Supp. 
1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.04(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988). 
108. For example, New Jersey's statute states: "Nothing herein contained shall be 
construed to include or to apply to any institution, bona fide club, or place of [public] 
accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) 
(West 1976 & Supp. 1988). 
Similarly, the District of Columbia's statute states that a place of public accommoda­
tion "shall not include any institution, club, or place of accommodation which is in its 
nature distinctly private." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1·2502 (1981 & Supp. 1988). 
A 1984 amendment to New York City's Local Law 63 specified criteria necessary to 
qualify as a private club. Any "institution, club or place of public accommodation," other 
than a benevolent order or religious corporation, "shall not be considered in its nature 
distinctly private if it has more than four hundred members, provides regular meal service 
and regularly receives payment ... directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers 
for the furtherance of trade or business." N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9) (1986). This city 
ordinance was declared constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Club Ass'n 
V. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988), and may influence states to incorporate simi­
lar distinguishing characteristics in their public accommodation statutes. 
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The courts, therefore, have established a number of criteria by which 
to determine whether an organization is private within the context of a 
public accommodation statute. 109 The most important factors include 
the selectivity in admission of members and the existence of limits on 
the size of membership. I 10 
These factors, hence, measure the privateness of an institution 
and determine whether an establishment is a public accommoda­
tion. III The requirement that a public accommodation be open to the 
public "undermines the significance of the private club exemption .... 
[T]he exemption adds nothing to the statute and is substantively su­
perfluous."ll2 In exempting the private institution, legislatures only 
seem to have specified what was not a public accommodation without 
restricting the statutes' scope in any way.113 Since the private exemp­
tion does not substantively alter the statute, it always is implicitly 
present in the statute, even if not expressly stated, and sets no new 
limit to the statutes' coverage. 114 
The courts have noted that the purpose of the exemption is to 
safeguard the right of freedom of association. I IS It permits organiza­
109. Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F.2d 96, 101-02 (4th Cir. 1968); 
Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203 (D. Conn. 
1974); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See supra note 96 
for a summary of the factors established by these courts. 
110. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 770. For further criteria, see supra note 96. 
111. The courts "provide criteria for deciding ... whether a group is private or 
public." McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 770 (emphasis added). Whether an entity is private or 
whether it is public is one question judged by the same standards. In McClure, when dis­
cussing the existence of limits on the size of membership, the court noted that the Jaycees 
invited an "unscreened, unselected, and unlimited number of persons" to their meetings. 
Id. at 773. See also National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 
N.J. Super. 522, 530, 318 A.2d 33, 37 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974) 
(Little League was a place of public accommodation because it was nonselective of its mem­
bers and invited the public at large to join); Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 
Cal. 3d 72, 81, 707 P.2d 212, 217, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 155 (1985) and Curran v. Mount 
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 732-33, 195 Cal. Rptr. 
325, 337 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984) (both boys' clubs were public ac­
commodations because they were open to all male youth and made no attempt to be selec­
tive in the admission of members); Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary 
Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 1058-59,224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 227 (1986) ("Rotary literature 
states that '[e]very Rotary club must have its windows and doors open to the whole 
world.' "). 
112. Note, The Private Club Exemption to the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study in 
Judicial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1112, 1120 (1969). 
113. Id. at 1120-21. 
114. The Connecticut Public Accommodation Statute lacks an express private insti­
tution exemption. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-63(1), 46a-64(a)(I) (West 1986). 
115. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,171 (1971) (private clubs have 
a right "to choose members upon a discriminatory basis."); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 
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tions of a truly private character to discriminate in the selection of 
their members because of each individual's underlying right to freely 
associate. In fact, an accommodation statute which included private 
establishments within its scope could be attacked on constitutional 
grounds. The right to freedom of association respects "the right of the 
individual to pick his own associates so as to express his preferences 
and dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining such clubs and 
groups as he chooses."116 Since the private exemption was added to 
stress the individual's right to freedom of association, it is necessary to 
examine whether this right poses any limitations to the public accom­
modation statutes. 
2) Constitutional Right to Freedom ofAssociation 
The United States Supreme Court, in Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, I 17 balanced Minnesota's interest in prohibiting discrimination 
through its public accommodation statute against the Jaycees' right to 
freedom of association. In pursuing its analysis, the Court identified 
two distinct constitutional interests, the freedom of intimate associa­
tion and the freedom of expressive association,118 and held that the 
enforcement of the state's public accommodation statute to compel the 
Jaycees to accept women as members did not infringe upon either in­
terest. 119 Although the constitutional right to freely associate did not 
limit the application of the public accommodation statute to the 
Jaycees, the following sections examine whether in certain circum­
stances the constitutional right of freedom of association might limit 
the statute's scope. 
a) Intimate Association 
The right of intimate association protects "the formation and 
298 (1966) (it "is the right of the individual to pick his own associates so as to express his 
preferences and dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining such clubs and groups as 
he chooses."); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("Inviolability of privacy in 
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom 
of association ...."); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp . .1143,1157 (S.D. Tex. 1970) ("If 
the government were allowed to regulate the membership of truly private clubs, private 
organizations, or private associations, then it could determine for each citizen who would 
be his personal friends and what would be his private associations, and the Bill of Rights 
would be for naught."). 
116. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298 (1966) (dictum); Cf Griswold v. Connecti­
cut, 381 U.S. 479,483 (1965) (right to select one's intimate associates free from governmen­
tal intrusion). 
117. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
118. Id. at 617-18. 
119. Id. at 621, 626-29. See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text. 
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preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships" best ex­
emplified by the family as an association that is intimately linked and 
that requires personal choices for its creation and sustenance. 120 To 
establish a right to freedom of association based on privacy and inti­
mate association, a group must be private. 121 Thus, an organization 
which is categorized as a public accommodation does not qualify as an 
intimate association. 122 Therefore, virtually by definition, a public ac­
commoda,tion cannot assert a constitutional right of freedom of inti­
mate association. The scope of the public accommodation statute and 
of the right to intimate' association are mutually exclusive, and the 
freedom of intimate association, in and of itself, should never limit the 
application of a public accommodation statute. 
b) Expressive Association 
A right of expressive association exists only when linked to an 
expressive activity. 123 Association for its own sake is not constitution­
ally protected; 124 Rather, freedom of expressive association is related 
120, Roberts, 468 U,S. at 618. A constitutional right of intimate association attend­
ing the creation and sustenance of a family regards marriage, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 
374 (1978), childbirth, Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), child rear­
ing and education, Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), cohabitation with one's relatives, Moore v. East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), and contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965). 
121. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20. 
Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments 
to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special 
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal 
aspects of one's life. Among other things, therefore, they are distinguished by 
such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to 
begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of 
the relationship. As a general matter, only relationships with these sorts of quali­
ties are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding of 
freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty. 
Id. 
See also Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 147 Cal. App. 
3d 712,730, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 336 (1983) ("[T]hose with a common interest may associ­
ate exclusively with whom they please only if it is the kind of association which was in­
tended to be embraced within the protection afforded by the rights of privacy and free 
association. "). In Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. 
Conn. 1974), the district court upheld the private club defense established by the defendant 
and stated: "To have their privacy protected, clubs must function as extensions of mem­
bers' homes and not as extensions of their businesses." Id. at 1204. See supra note 96 and 
accompanying text for the judicially-created criteria characterizing a private establishment. 
122. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. 
123. Id. at 627. 
124. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right ofAssociation, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 68, 73 
(1986) ("Association qua association did not implicate the first amendment."). 
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to first amendment rights. 
An individual's freedom 'to speak, to worship, and to petition the 
government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously 
protected from interference by the State unless. a correlative free­
dom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guar­
anteed.... Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in 
the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a 
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic,educational, religious, and cul­
tural ends}25 
Thus, the right of expressive association safeguards the ability of mem­
bers to express "those views that brought them together."126 The 
Court often has recognized that in a pluralistic society, association and 
organization are necessary for effectively advancing ideas and 
beliefs. 127 
While as so interpreted; the first amendment to the Constitution 
protects the right to associate for expressive purposes, this right is not 
absolute. 128 A state may infringe upon it "by regulations adopted to 
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, 
125. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. 
126. Id. at 623. 
127. See Citizens Against Rent Control Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 
U.S. 290 (1981). 
[T]he practice of persons shanng common views banding together to achieve a 
common end is deeply embedded in the American political process. The 18th­
century Committees of Correspondence and the pamphleteers were early exam­
ples of this phenomena [sic] and the Federalist Papers were perhaps the most 
significant and lasting example. The tradition of volunteer committees for collec­
tive action has manifested itself in myriad community and public activities; in the 
political process it can focus on a candidate or on a ballot measure. Its value is 
that by collective effort individuals can make their views known, when, individu­
ally, their voices would be faint or lost. 
Id. at 294. 
See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (non-violent ele­
ments of politically-motivated boycott were entitled to protection under the first amend­
ment); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (solicitation of prospective litigants by nonprofit 
organization that engages in litigation as a form of political expression and association 
constituted expressive association entitled to first amendment protection); Abood v. Detroit 
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (right under first amendment of non-union employees 
not to associate with collective bargaining agent in communication of ideas). 
128. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 

"Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly contro­

versial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more 
than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of 
speech and assembly." This is not to say, however, that in every setting in which 
individuals exercise some discrimination in choosing associates, their selective 
process of inclusion and exclusion is protected by the Constitution. 
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that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of 
associational freedoms."129 
The state has a compelling interest in eliminating discrimina­
tion.130 However, the state cannot pursue this interest if it results in 
the suppression of the association's expressive activity. 131 Suppression 
occurs when there is a "direct relation between membership exclusion 
and the organization's advocacy."132 A group may engage in an ex­
pressive activity which is changed in some degree if an excluded class 
is included, yet fail to qualify for protection under the right to expres­
sive association. For example, in Roberts, the Jaycees argued that the 
admission of women would alter their political positions and influ­
ence133 while a recreational club in Daniel v. Pau/ 134 contended that 
black members would change their club's attendance and activities. 13s 
Nevertheless, the organizations' expressive activities were not pro­
tected under the constitutional right of expressive association from the 
states' application of their anti-discriminatory legislation. 
The state's intervention must suppress, not incidently alter, the 
New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2234 (1988) (quoting 
NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958». 
129. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
130. Id. at 625. The state's interest in eliminating discrimination rests on its obliga­
tion to protect citizens from 
serious social and personal harms .... [D]iscrimination based on archaic and 
overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces 
individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to 
their actual. abilities. It thereby both deprives persons of their individual dignity 
and denies society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and 
cultural life .... That stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities 
that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination 
on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race. 
Id. 
In amending its Human Rights Law to prohibit discrimination in clubs that did not 
properly fall under the statute's private exemption, the city of New York stated that its 
compelling interest lay in providing all citizens with "'a fair and equal opportunity to 
participate in the business and professional life of the city.''' New York State Club Ass'n 
v. New York City, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2230 (1988) (quoting Local Law No. 63 of 1984, § 1, 
App. 14-15). This goal is frustrated by the "discriminatory practices of certain member­
ship organizations where business deals are often made and personal contacts valuable for 
business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed." Id.. 
131. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
132. Marshall, supra note 124, at 80. 
133. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27. 
134. 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (recreational club found to be a public accommodation and 
enjoined from denying admission to blacks solely on racial grounds). 
135. Id. at 300 n.2. At trial, the defendant stated: "'[W]e refused admission to 
[blacks] because white people in our community would not patronize us if we admitted 
Negroes to the swimming pool.' "Id. (quoting testimony). 
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expressive goals of the association in order for the latter to claim a 
constitutional right. 136 The organization's discriminatory criteria 
must relate directly to its expressive activity for the group to be safe­
guarded by the right to freedom of expression. 137 For example, a 
white supremacist group's exclusion of blacks directly promotes its 
ideological position. A public accommodation statute that required 
the group to accept blacks would violate the group's right to expres­
sive association. The same would apply to a Nazi association com­
pelled to accept Jews. The very goal of the association would be 
suppressed by the forced inclusion of the class it seeks to repress. Ad­
ditionally, a radical women's group seeking to make men second-class 
citizens would find its ideological goal countered by the acceptance of 
male members. 138 
The Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees 139 made 
this same inquiry by examining whether the exclusion of women was 
the fundamental purpose of the Jaycees. l40 Although the Jaycees ar­
gued that their aim was the promotion of young men's interests, the 
136. The Curran court stated: 
Taking [the right to freedom of association] literally as "governing" would afford 
protection to the most flagrant form of discrimination under the canopy of the 
right of free association. The answer is, of course, that those with a common 
interest may associate exclusively with whom they please only if it is the kind of 
association which was intended to be embraced within the protection afforded by 
the rights of privacy and free association. 
Curran, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 730, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 336. 
137. The U.S. Supreme Court, in New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 
108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988), stated: 
It is conceivable ... that an association might be able to show that it is organized 
for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired 
viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who 
share the same sex, for example, or the same religion. 
Id. at 2234. 
138. Under this analysis, the right of expressive association will limit public accom­
modation statutes only in the rare instance when a minority person attempts to join or 
volunteer services to an organization which seeks to eliminate the minority. Thus, in terms 
of practical impact, a claim for protection under the constitutional right to freedom of 
expression will seldom prevail over the state's anti-discriminatory interests. 
139. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
140. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627. Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, suggested 
a different test to determine the expressive rights of an association. Instead of adopting the 
majority's test which balanced an association's claim against the interest of the intruding 
state, Justice O'Connor focused on the commercial or expressive nature of the association. 
If the association were commercial, the state could enforce its anti-discrimination statute; if 
it was expressive, the association's right to freedom of expression would overcome the 
state's interest. Id. at 633-36, 638 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor found the 
Jaycees to be a commercial organization and therefore agreed that their first amendment 
claim failed. Id. at 639-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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Court found that the organization did not primarily advance a gender­
specific goal through its charitable and civic activities. 141 . Since the 
admission of women would not prevent the Jaycees from engaging in 
its principal activities or from disseminating its views,142 Minnesota's 
public accommodation statute did not violate the Jaycees' right of ex­
pressive association. 143 
Association based on ethnicity or religion might present constitu­
tional problems in certain circumstances. Where the purpose of a His­
panic heritage club or a Jewish fellowship group is to preserve its own 
culture or religion, the group may successfully claim a fundamental 
expressive goal which would be destroyed by the enforcement of anti­
discriminatory statutes. In many cases, the issue raised by the ·chal­
lenges of these groups would be resolved by statutory construction, 
and the constitutional issue would not be presented. Where the as­
sociations are classed as private institutions, they would fall outside 
the statute's scope and would be free to discriminate. However, when 
ethnic or religious associations are public accommodations, they may 
still have a constitutional right to expressive association. 
In evaluating that right, a significant difference exists between, for 
example, an all-French group and a non-French group. Those ex­
cluded from the latter are stigmatized, whereas tho·se denied member­
ship to the former suffer no significant ethnic rejection. The ethnic 
group inflicts no stigma on the excluded classes for two reasons. First, 
the nationality requirement in the ethnic group is more likely to be 
perceived as a means for preserving and fostering that group's culture 
rather than as a means of excluding classes subject to prejudice. Sec­
ondly, the many classes excluded from an ethnic group form a cate­
gory that is both too large and too diverse to suffer any real stigma. 144 
Thus, the state has a compelling interest in eliminating.exclusion­
ary groups which are open to all but specific nationalities. 145 . On the 
141. Id. at 627. 
142. Id. at 610. "There is no basis in the record for concluding that admission of 
women as full voting members will impede appellee's ability to engage in its constitution­
ally protected civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities or to disseminate 
its preferred views." Id. 
143. If a public accommodation statute does not require an organization to alter its 
basic purpose, the statute is not unconstitutional. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1947-48. See 
National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 
A.2d 33 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974) (req~iring Little League to admit 
girls under the public accommodation statute did not necessitate that the league cease play­
ing baseball, the league's specific purpose, and engage in other sports activities). 
144. Marshall, supra note 124, at 98-99. 
145. Id. at 99 ("The state interest, in short, is in seeing that any identifiable group is 
not singled out for adverse treatment."). 
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other hand, it is in the state's interest to foster associations which limit 
membership to a specific nationality for the purpose of preserving and 
promoting a particular heritage. 146 Each culture has its treasures that 
enrich the whole. "Cultural pluralism enriches the national culture, 
not only through the development of individuality, but also through 
diverse celebrations, traditions, communities, and heritage that form 
our national identity."147 
Thus, because the discrimination which results from ethnic or 
religious associations does not cause a stigmatizing evil and, because 
the government has a positive interest in protecting cultural pluralism, 
the state cannot demonstrate a compelling intere~t in eliminating the 
otherwise invidious discrimination by such groups. Without a com­
pelling interest to eliminate discrimination in groups that foster their 
own heritages, the state cannot lawfully apply the public accommoda­
tion statute to them. These ethnic and religious groups can claim a 
right of expressive association. Consequently, in certain circum­
stances, the constitutional right of freedom of association can limit the 
scope of a state's public accommodation statute. 148 
II. 	 QUINNIPIAC COUNCIL, Boy SCOUTS OF AMERICA, INC V. 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIESI49 
When refused a scoutmaster position because of her sex, Cathe­
rine Pollard, relying on these prior judicial interpretations of other 
states' public accommodation statutes, ISO had a number of reasons to 
146. Sengstock & Sengstock, Discrimination: A Constitutional Dilemma, 9 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 59, 123-24 (1967). 
147. Marshall, supra note 124, at 88. 
148. Of course, certain associations might characterize themselves as ethnic or reli­
gious as a pretext to engage in some unrelated activity. An all-Catholic or all-Jewish asso­
ciation whose principal activities are bowling and golf has. nothing to do with the 
preservation of a religion. Associations with no central practices which promote cultural 
or religious heritages should be put to the same test as others claiming a right to expressive 
association. This test prohibits exclusionary discrimination that does not directly affect the 
association's .expressive activity. These superficially cultural or religious associations would 
not be granted constitutional protection because their discrimination has nothing to do 
with perpetuating a heritage. 
149. 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (1987). 
150 .. . Id. at 297-99, 528 A.2d at 359. The court cited Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood 
~iwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1986); Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of 
Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. 
Ct. 1940 (1987); United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981); Na­
tional Organization of Women v. Little League Baseball, 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A.2d 33 
(1974), aff'd, 67 ~.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974). 
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expect relief under the similar Connecticut statute. lSI Cases in other 
jurisdictions supported both her contention that public accommoda­
tion statutes apply to membership organizations which are non-selec­
tive in their invitation to participate and that such application is 
constitutional. ls2 
Beginning with Little League, the courts consistently have held 
that a place of public accommodation was not limited to a fixed site. IS3 
Thus, the fact that the Boy Scouts gathered at various locations did 
not exclude them from being a public accommodation. ls4 As also· 
noted in Little League, an organization is a public accommodation if it 
offers advantages and goods on the basis of a general invitation to 
join. ISS Therefore, considering the Boy Scouts' open, broad, and ag­
gressive recruitment policy, including the use of the mass media, a 
positive finding that they offered their services to the general public 
was likely.ls6 Furthermore, Isbister and Curran precluded the Boy 
Scouts from escaping the statutes' coverage because of their non-profit 
character. ls7 
Pollard's claim also appeared to be an offshoot of the business­
men's association cases where the courts held that the "goods" which 
were wrongly denied women included leadership skills and promotion 
opportunities. ISS It seemed plausible that the leadership skills ac­
151. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-63(1), 46a-64(a)(I) (West 1986). See supra 
Section I, B for the history of this statute. 
152. See supra Section I, C and D for a discussion of these cases. 
153. National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. 
Super. 522,530,318 A.2d 33, 37 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974) (founda­
tion case establishing that a public accommodation need not have a specific geographical 
area). See supra notes 42 to 53 and accompanying text for a discussion of Little League. 
See also Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d 
1035, 1048,224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 219 (1986); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy 
Scouts of Am., 147 Cal. App. 3d 712,729, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 335 (1983), appeal dismissed, 
468 U.S. 1205 (1984); United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 768, 772 (Minn. 
1981). 
154. The Boy Scouts provide their services in a variety of physical locations includ­
ing schools, churches, firehouses, campsites, and private homes. Hearing Examiner's 
Memorandum at 19, Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352. 
155. Little League, 127 N.J. Super. at 530, 318 A.2d at 37 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 
338 A.2d 198 (1974). 
156. Hearing Examiner's Memorandum at 21, Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. 287, 
528 A.2d 352. 
157. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 82-84, 707 P.2d at 218-20, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 156-58; Cur­
ran, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 729-30, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36. See supra notes 56-70 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of these two cases. The Boy Scouts' major source of 
funding is "public giving through United Way." Hearing Examiner's Memorandum at 32, 
Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352. 
158. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059; McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 772. 
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quired from serving as scoutmaster and from training programs would 
similarly fall into the category of goods, privileges, and advantages, 
and that, therefore, under the public accommodation statute, the Boy 
Scouts could not deny voluntary leadership positions on a discrimina­
tory basis. 
In Roberts,159 the Supreme Court had stated that there are two 
types of constitutional rights that can limit the application of the pub­
lic accommodation statute: a right of association based on intimate 
personal relationships, and a right to associate for expressive pur­
poses. l60 The admission of a qualified woman as scoutmaster did not 
appear to overstep either of these limits. A Boy Scout troop was not 
apparently the kind of highly personal association protected by the 
right of intimate association from unjustified interference by the state; 
nor would a woman as scoutmaster seem to suppress the goals of the 
Boy Scouts to train and educate youth. A male-only policy is not a 
goal set forth by the scout law in the way a white-only policy is the 
aim of the Ku Klux Klan. The installation of a woman as scoutmaster 
might incidentally alter the method of formation but, as discussed 
above,161 such insubstantial changes would be insufficient to protect 
the Boy Scouts under the right of expressive association. 162 
The Connecticut Supreme Court carefully considered this judicial 
background against which Quinnipiac Council arose. Nevertheless, it 
noted that the particular issue for decision was different from that 
presented in prior cases. In those cases, the defendant organizations 
had refused plaintiffs access to goods and services offered to the public. 
In Quinnipiac Council, the defendant organization denied plaintiff, not 
its services, but the opportunity for the plaintiff to offer her services to 
159. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text for a dis­
cussion of this case. 
160. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18. See supra notes 120-48 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of these constitutional rights. 
161. This facet of the right of freedom of association is discussed in supra notes 132­
43 and accompanying text. 
162. The court in Quinnipiac Council stated: 
Although we need not reach those constitutional issues today, we note that those 
arguments have little merit in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent 
decisions in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), and Board of 
Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987). In 
both cases, the Supreme Court held that even if a public accommodation law 
infringes slightly on the constitutional rights of expressive association, that in­
fringement is justified because such statutes serve a compelling state interest in 
eliminating discrimination. 
QUinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 293 n.5, 528 A.2d at 356 n.5. 
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the organization. 163 Thus, the central issue in Quinnipiac Council was 
whether the proffer of services is an accommodation within the mean­
ing of the Connecticut statute. 
A) Facts 
In 1974 and in 1976, the defendant, Catherine Pollard, applied to 
Quinnipiac Council for a commission as Scoutmaster of Boy Scout 
Troop 13 of Milford, Connecticut. l64 On both occasions, she. was re­
fused on the ground that certain volunteer positions, such as scout­
master, were limited exclusively to men. 165 . 
Pollard's scouting skills were undisputed. In the years ·prior to 
her applications, Pollard had accumulated extensive experience in the 
Quinnipiac Council's scouting program. She had been a cub scout den 
mother, music merit badge counselor, and committee member of 
Troop 13. 166 From 1972 to 1976, when Troop 13 lacked an official 
scoutmaster, she served as its de facto scoutmaster. The scouting pro­
gram flourished under her d,irection; the boys in her troop advanced, 
and five attained the rank of eagle scout. 167 
After rejection of her second application, Pollard filed a com­
plaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Op­
portunities in December of 1976, alleging discriminatory public 
163. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 301, 528 A.2d at 360. 
164. Although the Boy Scouts permitted women to assume numerous leadership 
roles (see infra note 193), they did not allow women to become scoutmasters, assistant 
scoutmasters, webelos den leaders, assistant webelos den leaders, lone scout friends, 'or 
counselors. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 291, 528 A.2d at 355., ' . 
In February of 1988, tl,le Boy Scouts voluntarily opened these positions to women. 
The organization's withdrawal of its all-male requirement for the posi~ion of scoutmaster 
does not preempt the issue raised by Quinnipiac Council. The anti-discriminatory statutory 
protection available to volunteers remains uncertain and a relevant concern. . 
165. Id.at 290-91,528 A.2d at 355. On April 29, 1974, the Chief Scout Executive of 
the Boy Scouts of, America rejected Catherine Pollard's application in the following letter: 
Your request to be commissioned as a scoutmaster is difficult to turn down. The 
credentials you present are all commendable. We feel that the boy of scouting age 
looks to a man to establish his own standards of character. It is my obligation to 
adhere to this policy and thereby not authorize your request. 
Hearing Examiner's Finding of Fact 9 in the Memorandum of the Hearing Examiner of the 
Comm. on Human·Rights and Opportunities at 5, Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 
A.2d 352. 
166. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 290, 528 A.2d at 355. 
167. Id. An eagle scout is defined as "a boy scout who has been awarded 21 merit 
badges." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 713 (unabr. 1971). An eagle scout 
is a "boy scout of highest rank." FUNK & WAGNALLS STANDARD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 
414 (6th ed. 1977). 
121 1989] DISCRIMINATION AGAINST VOLUNTEERS. 
accommodation practices. 168 In a January, 1984, decision, the Com­
mission's Hearing Examiner held that the Boy Scouts had violated the 
Connecticut public accommodation statute and required them to offer 
the position of scoutmaster to Catherine Pollard. 169 In May of 1986, 
after finding that the Hearing Examiner had misconstrued the stat­
ute,170 the Superior Court of Connecticut reversed the Examiner's de­
cisionPI Catherine Pollard appealed the decision to the Appellate 
Division. Subsequently, the Connecticut Supreme Court transferred 
the appeal to itself. 172 
B) Issues Decided 
The Connecticut public accommodation statute defines "place of 
public accommodation, resort, or amusement" as "any establishment 
which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general 
public ...."173 The initial question in Quinnipiac Council, thus, was 
whether the organization was a "place of public accommodation" 
within the meaning of the statute. 174 
Chief Justice Peters, writing for the court, began by examining 
the Connecticut statute's language, legislative history, and remedial 
168. Hearing Examiner's Memorandum at 6, Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. 287, 
528 A.2d 352 (1987). 
169. Id. at 34. 
170. The Hearing Examiner found that the Boy Scouts organization was open to the 
public and constituted a "place" within the meaning of the statute. Hearing Examiner's 
Memorandum at 19-21, Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528· A.2d 352. Given these 
findings and declining to limit the application of the public accommodation statute to com­
mercial, business, and profit-oriented organizations, the Hearing Examiner held that the 
Boy Scouts was a public accommodation and violated the public accommodation statute 
when it rejected Pollard's application solely on the basis of her female gender. [d. at 20, 28­
29,34. 
The trial court reversed the conclusion of the Hearing Examiner, holding that the term 
"establishment" in the state's public accommodation statute "was intended· to encompass 
'every possible type of business imaginable' but not 'a singular, unique, eleemosynary insti­
tution' like the Boy Scouts of America." Quinnipiac CounCil, 204 Conn. at 291, 528 A.2d 
at 355. Furthermore, the trial court determined that the "position of scoutmaster doeS not 
fall within the rubric of 'services,' 'goods' or 'facilities' and hence is not a 'public accommo­
dation.''' Id. at 291-92, 528 A.2d at 355. 
171. The Superior Court's Memorandum of Quinnipiac Council (Chernauskas, J.), 
May 19, 1986. 
172.. The Connecticut Supreme Court, pursuant to Conn. Rules of Court § 4023 
(1988), has the authority to transfer any appeal from the Appellate Division to itself. 
173. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-63(1) (West 1986). 
174. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 295, 528 A.2d at 357. Since the court re­
solved that the proffer of services was not an accommodation, it never reached the issue of 
whether the Boy Scouts had denied Pollard "full and equal accommodations in any place of 
public accommodation, resort or amusement ... because of ... sex ...." CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 46a-64(a)(I) (West 1986). 
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purpose.175 The court first concluded that a physical site was not re­
quired in order to be a place of public accommodation. 176 Drawing on 
the similar Minnesota statute that was applied broadly in United 
States Jaycees v. McClure,177 the court held that the Connecticut stat­
ute "now regulates the discriminatory conduct and not the discrimina­
tory situs of an enterprise which offers its services to the general 
public." 178 
The court next examined whether the Boy Scouts' admittedly dis­
criminatory refusal to accept Pollard as a scoutmaster was an unlawful 
public accommodation practice. 179 Unlawful discrimination occurs 
when an "establishment" which serves "the general public" withholds 
its goods and services from a member of a protected class. 180 Thus, in 
order to discriminate in violation of the public accommodation stat­
ute, an organization must first satisfy the statutory definition of 
"establishment. " 
The court found that the term "establishment" includes business, 
commercial, non-profit, and private entities. 181 The key factor in de­
termining whether an organization is an "establishment" is whether it 
is held open to the public. 182 Thus, any service provider, regardless of 
its organizational status, is an "establishment" if it is open to the gen­
eral public. 183 Even a private organization which has no obligation to 
175. See supra section I, B. 
176. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 298, 528 A.2d at 358. 
177. 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981). See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text 
for the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of that state's public accommodation 
statute. 
178. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 298, 528 A.2dat 358. The court did not 
elaborate on this interpretation but referred to United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 
N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981), whose interpretation was found to be constitutional in Roberts 
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the Minnesota statute. 
179. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 298, 528 A.2d at 358. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 300, 528 A.2d at 359. The statute does not limit establishments to busi­
nesses, nor does it make any exceptions for private organizations. Unlike Connecticut's 
public accommodation statute, the California accommodation statute only lists "business 
estaolishments." It states: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and 
equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blind­
ness or other physical disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advan­
tages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind 
whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988). 
Certain states exempt private establishments, without defining them, from their public 
accommodation statutes. See supra note 107. 
182. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 300, 528 A.2d at 359. 
183. The Quinnipiac Council court illustrated the meaning of organizational status 
by the following examples. "A hospital ... cannot refuse its services to a member of the 
general public simply because the hospital is a nonprofit corporation. . . . Similarly, a 
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offer its services to all becomes bound by the public accommodation 
statute once it eschews selectivity.184 Therefore, to determine whether 
an organization is subject to the statute, it is necessary to analyze the 
facts of each case. 
The court, therefore, closely examined the facts in QUinnipiac 
Council and focused on whether the proffer of services was an "accom­
modation." In response to Pollard's argument that the Boy Scouts 
had denied her access to an "accommodation" when they refused her 
the opportunity to give of her services, the court held that the statute 
does not protect the volunteering of services. 18s "[A] statute that ad­
dresses a discriminatory denial of access to goods and services does not, 
on its face, incorporate an allegedly discriminatory refusal by an enter­
prise to avail itself of a claimant's desire to offer services." 186 Accord­
ingly, the court held that the Boy Scouts did not violate the statute­
in the statute's awkward terms, did not deprive Pollard of an accom­
modation-in refusing her the opportunity to serve as scoutmaster of 
Troop 13. 
C) Issues Not Decided 
Although rejecting the public accommodation claim as not cov­
ered by the statute, the court suggested, without deciding, that the 
state's employment discrimination statute187 might protect those prof­
fering their services from discrimination. 188 The court deeJIled it "es­
pecially significant" that the employment statute contained an express 
exception for a "bona fide occupational qualification or need" 
(BFOQ),189 which would permit employers to discriminate if they 
private university that opens its theater facilities for the entertainment of the general public 
cannot refuse admission for reasons ... made illegal by [§ 46a-64(a)(I)]." /d. at 299, 528 
A.2d at 359. 
184..Id. 
185. Id. at 301, 528 A.2d at 360. 
186. Id. 
187. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-6O(a)(I) (West 1986). Connecticut's Unfair 
Employment Practice statute states: 
It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (I) For an em­
ployer, by himself or his agent, except in the case 0/ a bona fide occupational 
qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from 
employment any individual or to discriminate against him in compensation or in 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, 
color, religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or 
past history of mental disorder, mental retardation or physical disability, includ­
ing, but not limited to, blindness. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
188. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 302, 528 A.2d at 360. 
189. Id. The court stated: "A review of our labor legislation discloses that our Gen­
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could meet the heavy burden of proving that such discrimination was 
necessary to the operation of the business. 190 . 
The Boy Scouts asserted this exception as part of their defense. 191 
They justified the male-only scoutmaster position on the need of boys, 
ages ten to fourteen, for a male role model. 192 The Boy Scouts claimed 
that their general policy regarding women in leadership positions did 
not manifest gender discrimination since they invited women to as­
sume numerous leadership positions. 193 However, for this particular 
position and for this particular age group, the Boy Scouts argued that 
their sex requirement was a BFOQ.194 
Since the court decided that volunteering of services was not pro­
tected by the statute,195 it did not reach, and thus did not fully evalu­
ate, the BFOQ issue.' Moreover, because the accommodation statute 
does not contain an express BFOQ exception, it could not be asserted 
as a defense for violation of the public accommodation statute. How­
ever, the court did note that the BFOQ appears "to be as relevant to 
voluntary services as it is to paid employment,"196 and that a BFOQ 
provision would provide the proper framework for evaluating the or­
ganization's claim that the boys' need for male role models permitted 
it to refuse the services of a talented woman. 197 Since a BFOQ provi­
eral Statutes treat employment discrimination separately from public accommodation dis­
crimination. We deem it especially significant that only the former statute contains an 
express exception for a 'bona fide occupational qualification or need.' " Id. 
190. See infra Section IV for a more detailed discussion of BFOQ. 
191. Although the Boy Scouts did not place a BFOQ label upon their argument, the 
court acknowledged it as such. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 293, 302, 528 A.2d at 
356,360, see Brief for Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. at5, 7, Quinnipiac 
Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352. 
192. Brief for Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. at 5, 7, QUinnipiac 
Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352. The Boy Scouts offer three general categories of 
scouting programs: Cub Scouting, Boy Scouting, and Exploring. The Cub Scouts program 
is open to girls and boys ages eight through ten. The Explorer program admits both male 
and female teenagers from age fourteen years upwards. However, the Boy Scouts program 
for ages ten through fourteen is open only to boys. Id. at 3-4. 
193. Id. at 6-7. At the time Quinnipiac Council was decided, women were allowed to 
be Cubmaster, Assistant Cubmaster, Den Leader Coach, Den Leader, Assistant Den 
Leader, Explorer Advisor, Associate Explorer Advisor, Lone c;ub Scout Friend and Coun­
selor, Council Commissioner, Assistant Council Commissioner, District Commissioner, 
Assistant District Commissioner, Unit Commissioner, Roundtable Commissioner, and 
Roundtable Staff Member. Hearing Examiner's Memorandum of Quinnipiac Council at 9. 
See supra note 164 for the positions that were closed to women. 
194. Brief for Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. at 5, 7, Quinnipiac 
Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352; Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 293, 302, 528 
A.2d at 356, 360. 
195. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 301, 528 A.2d at 360. 
196. Id. at 302, 528 A.2d at 360. 
197. Id. 
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sion does exist in the employment statute but not in the public accom­
modation statute, the court stated that it "is more consistent with a 
legislative intent to leave such practices to be regulated by statutes that 
address employment discrimination rather than by statutes directed to 
discrimination in public accommodations."198 
Quinnipiac Council leaves an important question unanswered: in 
the future, should volunteers bring their discrimination claims under 
the employment statute rather then under the public accommodation 
statute? Addressing this issue involves a two-fold examination. It first 
requires, in Part III, evaluating Quinnipiac Council and determining 
whether this decision should be rejected in favor of continuing the pre­
vious expansive judicial interpretations of the public accommodation 
statutes, either by adopting a different interpretation of the statutory 
language or by amending the statute itself. The question then necessi­
tates, in Part IV, exploring the appropriateness of protecting volun­
teers from discrimination under the employment statute as the 
Connecticut Supreme Court suggested. 
III. 	 PROTECTION FOR VOLUNTEERS UNDER THE PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATION STATUTE 
While the Connecticut Supreme Court in Quinnipiac Council 
ruled that the proffer of services was not an accommodation under the 
Connecticut public accommodation statute, an amended statute,199 or 
a different interpretation of the same statute, would yield a different 
result. Several states, excluding Connecticut, have public accommo­
dation statutes which contain the words "privileges" and "advan­
tages."200 In United States Jaycees v. McClure,201 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court interpreted these words as meaning, among other 
things, that: "[l]eadership skills are 'goods,' business contacts and em­
ployment promotions are 'privileges' and 'advantages' ...."202 
Using this new language and its broad construction, a court prop­
erly could regard the Boy Scouts' training in adult leadership skills as 
a "good," and the opportunity to serve as scoutmaster as a "privilege" 
and "advantage." From this perspective, Pollard's personal fulfill­
198. Id. 
199. See infra note 203 for a suggested amended statute. 
200. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 363.01 to 363.03 (West 1966 & Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-5.1 to 10:5-12 
(West 1976 & Supp. 1988). See supra note 86 for the full text of the Minnesota statute and 
note 58 for the full text of the California statute. 
201. 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981). 
202. Id. at 772. 
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ment from the position of scoutmaster is a good, a privilege, and an 
advantage, each fully protected by the public accommodation 
statute.203 
A revised interpretation of the existing Connecticut public ac­
commodation statute would likewise afford protection for volunteers. 
The opportunity to serve could be considered a goOd.204 Volunteers 
offer their services because of the sense of fulfillment and reward that 
comes from gratuitous giving. The satisfaction derived from serving 
others is, at least for the volunteer, a good.205 Thus, the term "goods" 
in the present statute could be interpreted to include these non-mate­
rial benefits. The addition of the terms "privileges and advantages" to 
the Connecticut public accommodation statute would clarify and sup­
port this broadened interpretation of the term "goods." 
This analysis illustrates that it is possible to enlarge the meaning 
of goods, privileges, and advantages to include the proffer of services. 
However, broadening the definition of these terms in an effort to en­
compass volunteers within the public accommodation statute may vio­
late the statute's intended purpose. As noted by the Quinnipiac 
Council court, the public accommodation statute focuses on the pro­
tected class' access to goods and services.206 It primarily safeguards 
recipients of goods and services against discrimination.207 On the 
other hand, profferers or providers of services compose the class pro­
tected by the employment statute. For this reason, enlarging the con­
cept of goods, privileges, and advantages to encompass the proffer of 
203. An amended statute as suggested in the text would read: "A place of public 
accommodation ... means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities 
or goods or privileges or advantages to the general public ...." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46a-63(1) (West 1986) (suggested amendments italicized). 
204. See Brief for Defendant by Susan Bartholomew at 28, Quinnipiac Council, 204 
Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (opportunity to become a scoutmaster and to work with young 
members between the ages of ten and fourteen on various projects and activities are 
"goods" denied women). 
205. "[A] volunteer [is] ... an individual engaging in behavior ... that is essentially 
(primarily) motivated by the expectation of psychic benefits of some kind as a result of 
activities that have a market value greater than any remuneration received for such activi­
ties." Smith, Altruism, Volunteers, and Volunteerism, in VOLUNTEERISM IN THE EIGHTIES 
25 (J. Harman ed. 1982). See also Van Til, Volunteering and Democratic Theory, in 
VOLUNTEERISM IN THE EIGHTIES 211 (J. Harman ed. 1982) ("[V]olunteering ... repre­
sents a significant contribution to the volunteer's own psychological health and self-actuali­
zation.") (quoting E. SCHINDLER-RAINMAN & R. LIPPITT, THE VOLUNTEER 
COMMUNITY: CREATIVE USES OF HUMAN RESOURCES 15 (1975». 
206. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 301, 528 A.2d at 360. 
207. Id. "[A] statute that addresses a discriminatory denial of access to goods and 
services does not, on its face, incorporate an allegedly discriminatory refusal by an enter­
prise to avail itself of a claimant's desire to offer services." Id. 
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services goes beyond the intent and nature of the public accommoda­
tion statute. It is an attempt to include a class traditionally protected 
by the employment statute. The distinct purposes of the public ac­
commodation statute and employment statute correctly prompted the 
Quinnipiac Council court to refer volunteers to the employment 
statute. 
The Quinnipiac Council court also found it significant that the 
accommodation statute lacked a BFOQ and regarded its presence in 
the employment statute as an indicium that volunteers more appropri­
ately fall under this latter statute. 208 As will become evident in the 
next section, a BFOQ provision would permit directors to refuse vol­
unteer services for job-related reasons essential for the organization's 
operation.209 If the public accommodation statute could apply to vol­
unteers, it would transfer to them the private exemption and constitu­
tional limits discussed in Part I. However, the statute would still fail 
to represent the countervailing interest of volunteer organizers and di­
rectors. In order to relieve organizations of the obligation of accepting 
all volunteer services, a statute which protects volunteers must contain 
a BFOQ exception.210 The absence of this provision in the public ac­
commodation statute is a second reason justifying Quinnipiac Coun­
cil's recommendation that volunteers have recourse to the 
employment statute for protection .against discrimination. 
208. Id. at 302, 528 A.2d at 360. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text for 
the court's discussion. . 
209. See infra Section IV for a discussion of BFOQ and its application to volunteer 
organizations. 
210. In Big Brothers, Inc. and Rimarcik v. Minneapolis Comm. on Civil Rights, 284 
N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 1979), the court held that Big Brothers was permitted to inquire into 
the sexual preference of an adult male volunteer and to pass this information to mothers of 
boys in the program. The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (MCLU), in an Amicus Brief, 
contended that 
even if Big Brothers, Inc. is considered to be under the public accommodation 
section, the prohibition against any inquiry [into plaintiff's sexual preference] 
should still be required ... [because] in most public accommodation situations 
inquiry does not occur. That is, a gas station attendant will not inquire as to one's 
affectional preference before serving him. 
Id. at 829 n.12. 
This observation suggests that a BFOQ under the public accommodation statute 
would be peculiar to volunteers proffering their services and usually would not apply to 
persons receiving services from a public accommodation. The MCLU also noted that "the 
relationship of Johnson [a volunteer] to Big Brothers, Inc. is analogized to the relationship 
of a potential employee to an employment agency. Amicus thus conclude[d] that ... it is 
impermissible for Big Brothers, Inc. to inquire into any of the protected criteria, including 
affectional preference, without showing that the criteria [sic] is a bona fide occupational 
qualification." Id. at 828-29. However, since the court found no discrimination, it had no 
need to resolve the BFOQ issue. See infra note 214. 
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A. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification 
Developed in employment discrimination statutes and case Jaw, Ii 
BFOQ is a job-related qualification essential for a business' opera­
tion. 211 An employer may refuse to hire an applicant if the exclusion 
is based upon a BFOQ, that is, a performance-related condition which 
would prevent the normal operation of the business.212 
The BFOQ exception is an affirmative defense raised by employ­
ers only after the plaintiff has first proven unlawful employment dis­
211. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that it is unlawful for an em­
ployer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (1982). 	 However, 
[n]otwithstanding any other provision[s] of this subchapter, ... it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, ... 
on the basis of ... religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where 
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reason­
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(I) (1982). 
Applying Title VII, courts have held that discrimination based on either religion, sex, 
or national origin was permissible in certain circumstances because the imposed require­
ment was a bona fide occupational qualification "necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise." Id. Sumitomo Shoji America v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 
176, 189, n.19 (1982) (although the issue was not before the Court, the Court stated that 
Japanese citizenship might be a BFOQ for certain positions at Sumitomo, a New York­
based Japanese-controlled company); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1977) 
(Alabama's regulation barring the hiring of women as guards in "contact" positions at the 
state's maximum security male penitentiaries was a BFOQ); Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (employer's requirement that female applicants not have 
preschool age children was a BFOQ issue precluding summary judgment); Kern v. 
Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (requirement that pilot convert to 
Islam was a BFOQ for job which necessitated flying over Mecca, a holy area prohibited to 
non-Moslems under penalty of death), aff'd mem., 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984); Pime v. 
Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 585 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 
1986) (hiring Jesuits as philosophy professors was a BFOQ since that religious affiliation 
was reasonably necessary for the normal operation of the Jesuit Catholic university). 
The primary legislative intent underlying the equal employment statute of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was to close the gap existing between the social and economic positions 
of blacks and whites. President Kennedy stated that the federal equal opportunity legisla­
tion would "help set a standard for all the Nation and close existing gaps." 109 CONGo 
REc. 11,178 (1963). Consistent.with the statute's chief purpose of improving the status of 
the black community, the BFOQ provision does not justify employment discrimination 
based on race. 110 CONGo REc.· 2550-63 (1964). An amendment, proposed by Senator 
McClellan of Arkansas, to include race and color as additional BFOQs was rejected as an 
amendment that "would destroy the bill." 110 CONGo REc. 13,825 (1964). 
212. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982). 
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crimination.213 If the· plaintiff fails to prove discrimination, it is 
unnecessary to inquire into the existence of a BFOQ.214 However, if 
the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer can present a BFOQ de­
fense, claiming that religion, nationality, or sex is a characteristic nec­
essary for the successful performance of the job.2IS Although the 
BFOQ is often called an "exception,"216 it is "mote accurately de­
scribed as a'justification' " for discrimination.217 
. In cases of sex discrimination,2ls there is either an "ability to per­
form"BFOQ or a "same sex" BFOQ.219 Employers have claimed an 
"ability to perform" BFOQ when they have been ~harged with dis­
crimiriation for excluding women from physically strenuous jobs.220 
213. lurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038, 1043 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated 
and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 
1333, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 
818, 822 (5th Cir. 1972); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th 
Cir. 1969) . .See also Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational 
Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (1977) ("Before the BFOQ provision becomes 
relevant, a party must first prove ... discrimination by an employer."). 
214. See Big Brothers, Inc. and Rimarcik v. Minneapolis Comm. on Civil Rights, 
284 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 1979). In Big Brothers, the court found no evidence of what it 
termed "actual" discrimination because the plaintiff's sexual preference, like any other dis­
tinguishing characteristic, was part of the information owed mothers of boys in the pro­
gram. Consequently, the court did not consider the BFOQ exception. Id. at 828. See also 
Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1975), 
aff'd, 570 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1978); Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 141, 
144 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (failure to prove discrimination made unnecessary an inquiry into 
the existence of a BFOQ). 
215. See supra note 211. The Congressional debates on Title VII's BFOQ exception 
offered the example of a theology professor at a religious college as a religion BFOQ. Ar­
guably, belief as well as knowledge is necessary for successful teaching of theology. On the 
other hand, a janitorial position at a religious institution does not carry a religion BFOQ. 
110 CONGo REc. 2585-93 (1964). For a nationality BFOQ, Congress gave the example of 
an Italian chef at an Italian restaurant where the chef's nationality reflected on the busi­
ness' success.ld. at 2549. 
216. Dothard V. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); Phillips V. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971); Rosenfeld V. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th 
Cir. 1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969); 
EEOC V. Spokane Concrete Prods., 534 F. Supp. 518, 523 (E.D. Wash. 1982). 
217. Sirota, supra note 213, at 1026. 
218. "[S]ex discrimination occurs when both men and women compete for a job, and 
an employer discriminates against members of one sex on the basis of cultural stereotypes." 
Id. at 1033. 
219. B. LINDEMANN SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAW 341 (2d ed. 1983). 
220. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (agent-telegra­
pher); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (telephone 
lineman); EEOC v. Spokane Concrete Prods., 534 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Wash. 1982) (truck 
driver); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (heavy-lifting general company jobs). 
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The courts have held that employers cannot assume categorically that 
a woman, because of her sex, cannot perform the particular work.221 
An employer may refuse an applicant on the basis of sex only upon 
proof of that individual's incapacity of performance.222 
A job requiring "contact" with the client or customer- which 
could potentially invade the latter's privacy may give rise to a "same 
sex" BFOQ. In Fesel v. Masonic Home ofDelaware, Inc.,223 the court 
upheld the employer's refusal to hire a male nurse's aid to attend fe­
male nursing home patients.224 The court in City of Philadelphia v. 
Pennsylvania Human Relations·Comm. 22s permitted a juvenile center 
to restrict youth supervisors, whose duties among others included su­
pervision of bathing, to persons of the same gender as those being su­
pervised.226 An Oklahoma district court found a "same sex" BFOQ 
for the labor and delivery room nursing staff, when the evidence 
showed that male nurses caused harmful levels of stress in the women 
giving birth. 227 
Directors of volunteer organizations placed in similar situations 
likewise should be able to assure the proper operation of their organi­
zations and the privacy of their members through either a "same sex" 
or an "ability to perform" BFOQ. However, protecting volunteers 
under the present public accommodation statutes, which lack BFOQ 
exceptions, would require a volunteer director to accept all gratuitous 
services.228 On the other hand, since a BFOQ exception exists in the 
employment statutes, safeguarding volunteers under these statutes 
221. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 
408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) stated that if "all or substantially all women" are incapable of 
safely and efficiently performing the job's responsibilities then an employer can refuse every 
woman applicant. Id. at 235. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rosenfeld v. South­
ern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) adopted the narrower test proposed by Bowe v. 
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), aff'd in part. rev'd in part, 416 
F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), which necessitated an evaluation of the individual female appli­
cant's ability to perform before permitting discrimination. Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1225. 
222. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545-47 (1971); Rosenfeld v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 
416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969). 
223. 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). 
224. Id. at 1354. The nursing home refused to hire a male nurse's aid because the 
size of the home would require him to be on duty alone during certain shifts and twenty­
two of its thirty retired guests were females who often objected to male care. 
225. 7 Pa. Commw. 500, 300 A.2d 97 (1973). 
226. Id. at 513, 300 A.2d at 104. 
227. EEOC v. Mercy Health Center, 29 FEP 159 (W.O. Okla. 1982). 
228. More precisely, the public accommodation statutes make it unlawful for the 
director to discriminate on the basis of protected characteristics. See supra note 23. 
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would permit directors to reject volunteers for performance-related 
incapacities. 
Although arising in the context of employment, the case of Har­
vey v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n 229 supports the application of a 
BFOQ to volunteers, After the YWCA discharged her, a female em­
ployee proved employment discrimination based on sex by showing 
that her dismissal was due solely to her pregnancy.230 However, the 
YWCA established that it discharged the plaintiff because she actively 
sought to represent her condition of unwed pregnancy as an "alterna­
tive lifestyle" to the club's female youth.231 Since this role model was 
contrary to the ideals and philosophy of the YWCA, the court held 
that a legitimate reason existed for the employee's dismissaJ.232 The 
dismissal based on sex was justified by non-discriminatory motives, 
similar to a BFOQ, which made the termination lawful. If the woman 
had been a volunteer of the YWCA, rather than an employee, the 
same "ability to perform" BFOQ would, by analogy, also apply. 
Litigating Quinnipiac Council under an employment statute 
which protects volunteers would permit the Boy Scouts to assert the 
"same sex" BFOQ defense and would thereby focus the decision on 
their reasons for prohibiting women from serving as scoutmasters. 
The Boy Scouts could then legally refuse Pollard's services only by 
proving that being male was a BFOQ for the position of 
scoutmaster.233 
229. 533 F. Supp. 949 (W.D.N.C. 1982). 
230. Id. at 954. Dismissal based on pregnancy is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
(1982). See also Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987) (female 
employee discharged under the club's rule prohibiting unmarried employees from becom­
ing pregnant). 
231. Harvey, 533 F. Supp. at 954-55. 
232. Id. at 956. 
233. The party claiming the BFOQ has the burden of proof. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Weeks, 408 F.2d at 232. See also Note, The Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act 0/1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 388-89 (1976) (discuss­
ing burden of proof in Title VII discrimination suits). 
The requirements for proving a prima facie case of discrimination are established in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The applicant must show: 
[1] that he belongs to a racial minority; [2] that he applied and was qualified for a 
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; [3] that, despite his qualifica­
tions, he was rejected; and [4] that, after his rejection, the position remained open 
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's 
qualifications. 
Id. 	at 802. 
In cases of "overt" discrimination where the defendant neither denies nor attempts to 
hide the existence of discrimination, the plaintiff need not first prove a prima facie case of 
discrimination before shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. See Bell v. Birming­
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Thus, in such circumstances, the BFOQ arguments presented in 
Quinnipiac Council, but not evaluated by the court, would become 
central.234 The Boy Scouts justified their gende~ policy on the psycho­
logical need of adolescent boys, in rapid physical and emotional devel­
opment stages, for a male role model. 235 The Boy Scouts also claimed 
that boys of scouting age who are just beginning to participate in activ­
ities outside the family benefit greatly from association with 'a male 
scoutmaster.236 Moreover, with the number of households without a 
father increasing, the Boy Scouts asserted that the policy of providing 
boys with a male scoutmaster has even more importance.237 
Although the burden of proving a male-gender BFOQ would be a 
heavy one,238 a BFOQ defense would focus the decision on the main 
issue: whether the Boy Scouts wrongfully discriminated against Cath­
erine Pollard when they denied her a scoutmaster position because of 
her sex.239 Instead of basing the legality of the discrimination on 
whether the refusal of a volunteer position is an accommodation, the 
court could base its decision on whether the rejection is justified by a 
male-gender BFOQ. No matter how the BFOQ issue is resolved, the 
ham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984); 
Stonefield, supra note 104, at 106-09. 
Quinnipiac Council presents a case of "overt" discrimination because the Boy Scouts 
admitted that their rejection of Ms. Pollard was based on sex. Their letter of refusal IS 
direct evidence of discrimination and creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination. 
See supra note 165. 
234. Since Quinnipiac Council was litigated under the present public accommodation 
statute, which lacks a BFOQ, the Boy Scouts' BFOQ arguments were irrelevant. Quin­
nipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 293 n.6, 528 A.2d at 356 n.6. Thus, the court did not deter­
mine "whether the plaintiff and its parent organization [were] justified or misguided in their 
view that the desirability of male role models outweighs the value of the services that tal­
ented women might provide to the boy scouts." Id. at 302, 528 A.2d at 360. 
235. Brief for Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. at 5, Quinnipiac 
Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352. 
236. Id. at 4. 
237. Id. at 5. 
238. The Boy Scouts would have the burden of proving that the need for male role 
models outweighed the value of the services of qualified women. Quinnipiac Council, 204 
Conn. at 302, 528 A.2d at 360. 
239. If the case had been decided by applying a BFOQ, Pollard could have relied on 
a digest decision 'of the Equal Employment Opportunity Comm., EEOC Dec. LA. 68-4­
538E, 2 FEP 537, 537-38 (1969), which held that the Head Start program's selection of a 
man rather than a woman who had previously adequately fulfilled the position was unjusti­
fied by the claim that the children needed a male image when the position involved mini­
mum contact with the children. The Boy Scouts, however, might distinguish this case from 
Quinnipiac Council because the children in Head Start were not adolescent boys whose 
need for a male image is greater and because the position of scoutmaster may involve more 
contact with the boys than a Head Start position. 
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presence of a BFOQ serves a positive function by centering the deci­
sion on the real issue. 
6. Are Volunteers "Employees"? 
In addition to the similarity between volunteers and employees 
who both offer rather than receive services, the need for a BFOQ in a 
statute protecting volunteers is another reason for advancing the em­
ployment statute as the appropriate act under which to safeguard 
those prof erring their services. However, the employment statute will 
properly protect volunteers only if they can be considered employees. 
The definitions of "employees" offered by Congress and the legisla­
tures fail to provide the distinguishing characteristics of employees.240 
An examination of judicial decisions reveals that, although courts are 
divided on the issue, volunteers cannot clearly be regarded as employ­
ees.241 Nevertheless, for purposes of discrimination, those decisions 
granting relief to volunteers under the employment statute appear 
more judicially equitable.242 
The division among the courts as to whether volunteers are em­
ployees stems from their emphasis on compensation of the person 
rather than control over that person. Those courts which focus on the 
fact that employees receive compensation for their services conclude 
that volunteers are not employees.243 On the other hand, courts which 
stress the fact that employees work under the control and supervision 
of an employer hold that volunteers are employees.244 
240. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e(f) (1982) defines "employee" in the following manner: 
The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer, except that 
the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in any 
State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any 
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee 
on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of 
the constitutional or legal powers of the office. 
The definition provided by the Connecticut General Statutes is representative of other 
states' definitions. The Connecticut legislature defined the term "employee" as "any person 
employed by an employer but ... not ... any individual employed by his parents, spouse or 
child, or in the domestic service of any person." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-51(9) 
(West 1986). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1O:5-5(f) (West 1976 & Supp. 1988); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 43, § 954(c) (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1988). 
241. See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text for an analysis justifying this 
position. 
242. See infra notes 266-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of this position. 
243. See infra notes 245-53 and accompanying text for the development and applica­
tion of this characteristic. 
244. See infra notes 254-62 and accompanying text for cases which support this 
position. 
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Compensation is a major factor that distinguishes employees from 
volunteers who render their services gratuitously.24s The dictionary 
definition of employee is "any worker who is under wages or salary to 
an employer."246 Courts have noted that" 'An employee' ... means 
someone who works for another for hire. "247 In Smith v. Berks Com­
munity Television,248 the court emphasized the distinction between 
paid and unpaid services and found no protection for volunteers under 
the employment statutes. In Smith, the court decided the issue of 
whether volunteers were "employees" within the meaning of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,249 and held that they were not.2SO In the court's 
view, the purpose of Title VII was to eliminate the loss or diminution 
in one's means of livelihood because of that person's race, color, sex, 
religion, or national origin.2SI Employee status requires an economic 
"relationship between the individual and the so-called principal" 
which makes the individual "susceptible to the discriminatory prac­
tices which the act was designed to eliminate. "2S2 Volunteers, being 
unpaid, were not subject to the discrimination which the statute was 
designed to prevent. They were not denied access to a means of liveli­
hood and thus were not protected by the statute.2S3 
A separate group of cases involving volunteer firefighters, how­
ever, held that volunteers were covered by the anti-discrimination stat­
ute.2S4 These cases relied on other factors which characterize 
245. See Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers of America, Local Union No.1 v. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chern. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 167 (1971); Smith v. Berks Commu­
nity Television, 657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Clorer v. Blessington, 19 N.J. Misc. 253, 
18 A.2d 712 (1941). 
246. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 743 (unabr. 1971). 
247. Meyer Dairy, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 429 F.2d 697, 701 n.5 (10th 
Cir. 1970). See People v. Kirstein, 6 Mich. App. 107, 114, 148 N.W.2d 539,543 (Ct. App. 
1967). 
248. 657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
249. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(h)-5 (1982). 
250. Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 796. 
251. Id. at 795. 
252. Id. (quoting Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983». 
253. Id. at 795-96. See also Clorer v. Blessington, 19 N.J. Misc. 253, 18 A.2d 712 
(1941), where the court likewise considered remuneration as the determining factor in dif­
ferentiating an employee from a volunteer. The court held that the claimant, injured while 
assisting the alleged employer in changing a truck tire, was an employee and not a volun­
teer because he had received wages for his services. Id. at 255, 18 A.2d at 713. 
254. Hebard v. Basking Ridge Fire Co. No. I, 164 N.J. Super. 77, 395 A.2d 870 
(1978); Harmony Volunteer Fire Co. & Relief Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Comm.; 459 A.2d 439 (Pa. Commw. 1983); Shepherdstown Vol. Fire Dept. v. West Vir­
ginia Human Rights Comm., 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983). These fire departments, like 
the Boy Scouts with regard to Catherine Pollard, failed to accept the volunteered services 
of qualified women, solely on the ground that they limited these positions exclusively to 
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employees. They emphasized the fact that employees are under the 
supervision and direction of an employer who controls the way the 
work is done and has the power of discharge for non-performance.255 
In Harmony Volunteer Fire Co. & ReliefAss'n v. Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Comm., 256 the court held that the volunteers of the fire de­
partment were employees, notwithstanding the fact that they were un­
paid.257 The court based its decision on the control which the 
company had over its volunteer members.258 The company selected 
its own firefighters, had the power to discharge them for non-perform­
ance, and directed both the work they did and the manner in which it 
was accomplished.259 In Hebard v. Basking Ridge Fire Co. No. 1,260 
the court considered the fact that the fire department was a municipal 
service funded by the town as relevant to the analysis of whether a 
volunteer could be an "employee."261 This funding was another indi­
cium of control, warranting the conclusion that volunteer firefighters 
were employees both of the town and of the company and were thus 
protected from discrimination by the employment statute. 262 
The cases, though divided, complement one another and lead to a 
better understanding of the necessity, and difficulty, of protecting vol­
unteers under the employment statute. If the question is approached 
purely theoretically, then, by the rules oflogic, volunteers are not em­
ployees and do not fall under the employment statute. However, if the 
issue is approached practically with an eye to dispensing justice, vol­
unteers, because of the many likenesses they share with employees, 
should be covered by the anti-discriminatory employment statute or a 
similar act specifically enacted for volunteers. 
males. The courts held that the women were covered by the employment statutes, that sex 
was not a BFOQ, and that the companies had illegally discriminated against women. 
255. Key Ins. Exch. v. Washington, 7 Cal. App. 3d 209, 212,86 Cal. Rptr. 542, 544­
45 (1970); County of Erie v. Board of Trustees of Buffalo, 62 Misc.2d 396, 400, 308 
N.Y.S.2d 515, 519 (1970). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1984). 
The definition of servant states: "A servant is a person employed to perform services in the 
affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the 
service is subject to the other's control or right to control." Id. 
256. 459 A.2d 439 (pa. Commw. 1983). 
257. [d. at 442. In Shepherdstown Vol. Fire Dept. v. West Virginia Human Rights 
Comm., 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983), the court reached the same conclusion but under 
the state's public accommodation statute. The court found that the volunteer fire depart­
ment was a "place of public accommodation[ )" which had denied equal rights to women 
because of sex. Id. at 351, 353-54. 
258. Harmony Volunteer Fire Co., 459 A.2d at 442. 
259. [d. 
260. 164 N.J. Super. 77, 395 A.2d 870 (1978). 
261. [d. at 83-84, 395 A.2d at 873. 
262. [d. 
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Falling under the first approach, the cases which involve volun­
teer firefighters focused on the likeness between volunteers and em­
ployees263 without considering the compensation characteristic 'which 
distinguishes the two classes.264 However, it is a general rule oflogic 
that a species is distinguished from another species by its differentiat­
ing characteristics.265 The fact that volunteers and employees both 
work under the control and superVision of an employer does not mean 
that volunteers are employees; it merely means that they have a simi­
lar characteristic, which must be considered along with the differenti­
ating characteristic, the fact that volunteers receive no remuneration 
from the employer for their services. The conclusion of the cases in­
volving the "volunteer" firefighters appears supportable only if one be­
lieves that this differentiating characteristic is unimportant to the 
meaning of the term "employee," a proposition which both the dic­
tionary definition and longstanding case law. make hard to accept. 
Despite the fact that volunteers are not technically employees and 
consequently should fall outside the scope of the employment statute, 
there are several policy reasons for protecting volunteers under the 
employment statute. First, volunteers presently have no anti-discrimi­
nation statution protection; second, the purpose of the employment 
statute is not limited to pecuniary discrimimition;266 and finally, vol­
unteers share many likenesses with employees. 
At present,· there exists no legislation which specifically safe­
guards volunteers against discrimination.267 Nevertheless, it is impor­
263. There are other similarities between volunteers and employees that have not 
been noted in the cases. Sociologists note that voluntarism is frequently the road to em­
ployment. Women volunteer in order to consider the possibility of returning to work, and 
men thinking of second careers volunteer in order to experiment in a new area of interest. 
See Schwartz, The Rights of Volunteers: A Response, in VOLUNTEERISM IN THE EIGHTIES 
73 (J. Harmon ed. 1982). Educators emphasize the value of career insights which teenagers 
acquire by volunteering. See THE VOICES OF VOLUNTEERS (R. Williams ed. 1980). 
264. See supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases which 
support this as a distinguishing characteristic between employees and volunteers. 
265. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 3, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (1941). For ex­
ample, to determine whether cats are dogs, one examines their distinguishing, not their 
similar, characteristics. Simply because both cats and.dogs are four-footed does not mean 
that cats are dogs; the differences are more telling than the likenesses. 
266. See infra notes 272-91 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the other 
purposes of the employment statu~e. 
267. The Connecticut employment statute, however, could be amended to include 
volunteers. The suggested statute would state: 
It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an em­
ployer or volunteer director, by himself or his agent, except.in the case of a bona 
fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to accept 
volunteer services or to bar or to discharge from employment or voluntarism any 
individual or to discriminate against him in compensation or in terms, conditions 
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tant that volunteers be protected against discrimination which "both 
deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the ben­
efits of wide participation in political, economic, and culturallife."268 
Without this legislative protection, members of a minority class volun­
teering their services to the local library could be refused merely on 
account of their race or national origin. A hospital could deny a 
candy stripe position to a male teenager on the grounds that the work 
is more appropriate to women, or a male judge could .refuse a judicial 
internship to any female applicant because of the judge's conviction 
that the practice of law is not appropriate for women. Discriminatory 
conduct thus is illegal if practiced against employees but legally per­
missible if practiced against volunteers. Yet, because the same "stig­
matizing injury" which accompanies the denial of equal 
opportunities269 ensues, and no statute facially includes volunteers as a 
protected class, the employment statute is presently the most appro­
priate act under which to safeguard volunteers against discrimination. 
The Smith court stressed only one of the purposes of the employ­
ment statute.270 The court focused on the statute's purpose to ensure 
an equal opportunity to a livelihood and to forbid disparities in income 
due to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Since volunteers 
are unaffected by discriminatory practices which bar access to a liveli­
hood or which result in a diminution of income, the court concluded 
that volunteers were not protected by the employment statute.271 
However, "Congress did not intend to confine the scope of [the 
employment statute] simply to instances of discrimination in pecuni­
ary emoluments."272 Employment discrimination exists equally when 
some people are treated less favorably than others in the "terms, con­
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of ... race, color, reli­
gion, sex, or national origin."273 This discrimination can occur when 
or privileges of employment or voluntarism because of the individual's race, color, 
religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past 
histc?ry of mental disorder, mental retardation or physical disability, including, 
but not limited to, blindness .... 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-6O(a)(I) (West 1986) (suggested amendments italicized). 
268. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625. 
269. Id. 
270. The Smith court stated that the purpose of the employment legislation was to 
eliminate the loss or diminution in a person's livelihood because of race, color, sex, religion, 
or national origin. Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795. See supra notes 248-53 for a detailed dis­
cussion of Smith. 
271. See supra note 253 and accompanying text for the court's decision. 
272. Rodriguez v. Board of Education of Eastchester Union Free School Dist., 620 
F.2d 362, 366 (2d Cir. 1980). 
273. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). For the full text of this federal statute, see 
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protected classes are subject to a hostile working environment,274 are . 
denied promotion opportunities,275 insurance276 and retirement bene­
fits,277 pregnancy leaves,278 or are unjustifiably discharged.279 Thus, 
employers violate the employment statute if they refuse minority 
workers promotion opportunities or equal working' conditions despite 
the fact that they hire them at a wage comparable to their counter­
parts. The purpose of the employment statute, consequently, extends 
to eliminating inequality in non-monetary forms of compensation. It 
prohibits all forms of discriminatory treatment even if that conduct 
supra note 211. The Connecticut employment statute further protects the categories of age, 
ancestry, present or past history of mental disorder, mental retardation, and physical disa­
bility, including but not limited to blindness. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-6O(a)(I) 
(West 1986). See supra note 187 for the full text of the Connecticut statute. 
274. "[T]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' in [Title VII] is 
an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a 
working environment heavily chargCd with ethnic or racial discrimination." Rogers v. 
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). 
Courts have applied this principle to hostile working environments due to race, 
Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality V. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Gray V. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), to religion, Compston V. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976); 
Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975), to national origin, 
Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977), and to sex, 
Zabkowicz V. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984). 
275. See Hishon V. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (eligibility for promotion to 
a partner in a law firm was a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment granted to 
those hired as associates); Lee v. Conecuh County Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 
1981) (employer disregarded black male's superior job-related qualifications in promoting 
others lacking the same). 
276. Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 467 
U.S. 1255 (1984) (employer practice of providing dependent coverage only to persons 
deemed "head of household" resulted in sex discrimination because only 37% of females as 
opposed to 95% of males qualified for dependent coverage); EEOC v. Fremont Christian 
School, 609 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (religious school's policy of providing health 
insurance only to full time "head of household" employees, whom it believed could only be 
male, was invalidated). 
277. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (employer violated Title 
VII by requiring female employees to make larger contributions than males to the pension 
benefit plan). 
278. Greenspan V. Automobile Club of Michigan, 495 F. Supp. 1021, 1049-50 (E.D. 
Mich. 1980) (discrimination occurs when pregnant employees are forced to terminate 
rather than take sick leave); In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. Maternity Benefits Litig., 602 
F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1979) (policy which guaranteed reinstatement to all those returning 
from disability leave except women disabled by pregnancy was a discriminatory practice). 
279. Slack V. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975) (black employees wrongly dis­
charged when they refused to do work not required of similarly situated white employees); 
Lowry v. Whitaker Cable Corp., 348 F. Supp. 202, (W.D. Mo. 1972) (employer's numerous 
premature warnings and departure from normal practices showed racial discrimination in 
discharge), aff'd, 472 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1973). 
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denies no pecuniary advantage.28o 
Volunteers receive a benefit analogous to the promotion opportu­
nities afforded employees. The experience which volunteers acquire 
from proffering their services is, in many instances, the first step to 
employment or to a better volunteer position.281 The denial of the 
opportunity to gain this experience is similar to refusing an employee 
promotion opportunities; both suffer a discrimination which the broad 
purpose of the employment statute seeks to eliminate. 
Directors of volunteer organizations, like employers, can also 
subject minority classes to a hostile working environment. In an effort 
to discourage minority workers from applying or remaining, such or­
ganizations can harass them with discriminatory intimidation, ridi­
cule, and insult. Such conduct, whether practiced against a volunteer 
or against an employee, fosters and perpetuates the same discrimina­
tion in the workplace proscribed by the employment statute and is 
equally "repugnant, unworthy, and contrary to . . . national 
policy."282 
Both volunteers and employees are also susceptible to unjustified 
discharges. Dismissed under pretext, these discharges heavily pollute 
the working and recreational environment with discrimination and 
substantially destroy the emotional and psychological well-being of 
minority classes,283 a harm which legislatures intended to eradicate 
with employment statutes.284 
As noted above in the BFOQ discussion,285 the employment stat­
ute was not aimed at assuring a job to everyone irrespective of their 
abilities. Nevertheless, it was intended "to eliminate artificial and ar­
bitrary standards bearing no relationship to a person's job perform­
ance."286 Employers who reject applicants with arrest records,287 
280. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). "[T]he language of 
Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. The phrase 'terms, con­
ditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment." Id. at 64 (quoting 
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1971). 
281. See supra note 263. 
282. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002, 1012 
(E.D. Pa. 1970), ajJ'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
283. Rogers V. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 
(1972). 
284. Id. 
285. See supra Part IV, Section A. 
286. Boyce V. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402, 404 (D. D.C. 1972). 
287. Gregory V. Litton Systems, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (denial of employment 
because of arrest record had illegal discriminatory effect on blacks); Carter v. Gallagher, 
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convictions of crimes which have no relation to the work,288 dishonor­
able military discharges,289 or poor credit records290 violate the em­
ployment statute which proscribes not only open discrimination but 
also conduct which may seem fair, but which has a discriminatory 
effect on minorities.291 Similar capricious and prejudicial require­
ments could provoke a director to tum away a volunteer from associa­
tions such as the Senior Citizens Club, the Historical Society, the 
Ukrainian Youth Association, or the Hospital Auxiliary. Because the 
employment statute aims at eliminating these discriminatory practices, 
its relief should extend to volunteers. 
The court in Smith not only failed to consider the secondary pur­
poses of the employment statute which apply equally to volunteers, it 
also, by focusing only on the difference of paid and unpaid services 
between employees and volunteers, overlooked a number of additional 
similarities between the two classes.292 Both groups not only proffer 
services, they are also selected and trained by a director or an em­
ployer;293 both do work which is supervised and controlled;294 and 
both can be discharged for non-satisfactory performance.295 Stressing 
these considerable likenesses rather than singling out the difference 
tips the balance in favor of considering volunteers eligible for protec­
tion under the employment statute.296 
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (injunction against inquiry into arrest records), cert. denied, 
406 U.S. 950 (1972). 
288. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (practice of 
refusing consideration for employment to persons convicted of a crime other than minor 
traffic offense disqualified black applicants at a significantly higher rate than whites). 
289. Dozier v. Chupka, 395 F. Supp. 836, 850 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (court invalidated 
bonus points for honorable discharge). 
290. Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974) (employer's policy of 
discharge for two garnishments in one year disproportionately subjected blacks to dis­
charge); Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (employer 
prohibited from discharging a black person solely because his wages had been garnished to 
satisfy judgments). 
291. See Cloherty, Discriminatory Employment Practices, 54 CONN. BAR J. 523, 530 
(1980) (job requirements which are facially neutral may have a disproportionate impact on 
protected classes). 
292. Smith v. Berks Community Television, 657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987). See 
supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text for a summary of Smith. 
293. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553,557 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 896 (1972). 
294. Id. See supra note 255 for further references. 
295. See Harmony Volunteer Fire Co. & Relief Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Human Rela­
tions Comm., 459 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. Commw. 1983). 
296. It should be noted that the remedy available to volunteers under the statute 
would be limited to that of injunctive relief. Since volunteers are not compensated, the 
remedy of back pay, which is provided by the employment statute, is inapplicable to volun­
teers. Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795. 
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This judicially sound application of the- employment statute to 
volunteers, however, does not negate the need for more specific legisla­
tion. On the contrary, this discussion should influence legislatures 
either to enact an anti-discrimination statute particularly safeguarding 
volunteers,297 or to amend the present employment statute to ex­
pressly include volunteers.298 Such legislation would eliminate the 
possible confusion ensuing from the inclusion of volunteers, who are 
not by definition employees, under an employment statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Quinnipiac Council addressed the question of whether volunteers 
are protected against discrimination under Connecticut's public ac­
commodation statute. The Connecticut statute's legislative history 
and the judicial interpretations of other states' similar statutes mani­
fest a repeated broadening of public accommodation statutes to pro­
tect more classes from a larger number of offenses.299 This expansive 
trend seemed to predict a continued enlarging of the public accommo­
dation statute to include volunteers. However, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court held that the proffer of services was not an accommo­
dation because, in offering their services, volunteers are not denied ac­
cess to goods and services. Thereupon, the court suggested, without 
deciding, that the employment statute might protect those volunteer­
ing their services from discrimination. 300 
An examination of the characteristics of volunteers, and of the 
nature of both the public accommodation statute and the employment 
statute, justifies the court's suggestion. As a result of the differences 
between these two statutes, the absence of any specific legislation cov­
ering the volunteering of services, the necessity of safeguarding volun­
teers from the sensitive injustice of discrimination, the broad purpose 
of the employment statute, and the many similarities between volun­
teers and employees, the employment statute is the appropriate act 
under which to safeguard volunteers from the refusal of positions on a 
discriminatory basis. Nevertheless, because confusion may ensue from 
the fact that volunteers are not by definition "employees," the most 
unambiguous means of obtaining protection against discrimination for 
297. Since there are many similarities between volunteers and employees, a statute 
specifically enacted for volunteers would in many respects resemble the employment 
statute. 
298. See supra note 267 for a possible amendment to the employment statute. 
299. See supra Part I, Sections Band C for a discussion of the legislative and judicial 
expansion of the scope of public accommodation statutes. 
300. See supra Part II for a discussion of Quinnipiac Council. 
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volunteers is the enactment of an anti-discrimination statute specifi­
cally safeguarding volunteers, or an amendment expressly including 
volunteers in the present employment statute. 
Diane C Desautels 
